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THE FOX TAKES OVER THE CHICKEN HOUSE:
CREDITOR INTERFERENCE WITH FARM
MANAGEMENT

PHILLIP

L.

KUNKEL*

I. INTRODUCTION
Within the last several years, many Midwestern farmers have
found themselves under financial pressure brought on by low
commodity prices, high interest rates, declining land values, and
various other factors. These factors have forced agricultural lenders
who made operating loans to these farmers to take drastic actions
such as foreclosures, repossessions, and liquidations in order to
collect their problem loans. 1
Oftentimes, lenders do not initiate these collection efforts
immediately upon the onset of the farmer's financial difficulties. It
may not be possible for the lender to commence collection
procedures immediately and when finally begun, these procedures
will require some amount of time to complete. As a result, the
lender will be forced to live with his loan. 2 During this phase in the
life of a loan - after the lender recognizes that the loan is a
problem loan, but before initiation of collection procedures - each
*B.A., St. John's University, Collegeville, Minnesota, 1974; J.D., University of Minnesota,
1977; partner in Moratzka, Dillon & Kunkel, Hastings, Minnesota.
1. l. FREY & R. BEHRENS, LENDING TO AGRICULTURE ENTERPRISES 219-24 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as FREY & BEHRENS]. The authors indicate that "[a]ction to collect the loan ordinarily is taken
only after all [other] measures have proved ineffective." Id. at 222.
2. Id. at 218, 222. Lenders usually initiate collection efforts only after "lengthy negotiations
with the dehtor, attempts to improve the creditor's position.,
and efforts to institute a program of
correction." Id. at 222.
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party will be guided by what he determines is in his best interest.
The lender will do all it can to improve its position in order to
enhance its chances of collection including: Attempting to acquire
additional collateral, strongly encouraging the. borrower to sell
certain assets, or extending payment dates. The farmer, however,
in most cases, will do all he can to prevent a total liquidation. If this
means succumbing to the pressures placed upon him by the lender,
he will often do so.
In an effort to collect without resorting to legal process, a
lender will often exert considerable "leverage" on the borrower.
One person's leverage, however, may well be another's "control."
In fact, during this period, "the debtor may lose full control of his
business affairs temporarily. "3
This Article will examine the possible consequences to the
lender who takes control of the farming operation in an effort to
collect its loan. The Article will concentrate on the lender who
makes an "operating loan ' 4 to a farming operation, since the
potential for creditor interference with farm management would
appear to be greatest with these loans.
II. THE AGRICULTURAL OPERATING LOAN
The agricultural operating loan is a special purpose loan. It is
structured to coincide with the production cycle of the commodity
or commodities that will serve as the basis of repayment. In most
instances, the operating loan will be of relatively short duration. In
the case of a Midwestern crop loan, the loan will be payable' in full
in the fall of the year, following the harvest. The farmer will
typically require a new loan in the spring of the following year to
provide the necessary funding for that year's crop. 5
The lender will generally secure an agricultural operating loan
with very broad security agreements that cover all commodities
owned at the time the loan is made as well as all after-acquired
commodities. 6 The lender must necessarily secure an operating
li'

3. Id. ;it 218. While progran s designed ti correcl prolemhln loans involve hardlshipls. lenders and
il clttrs thien achieve viable solluiions to ile iroblem. Id. at 218-19. See Rome,. '/e Busiu.

Wllrbmat -

A

Primer.for Participatn
4 ' Creditors, II

U.C.C.

-.J.

183,

201-02 (197)) (liscusses

tlhi

relati ishipi between control an(d leverage in the debtor-creditot re.latiitinshil).
4. An "operating loan" for purposes of this Article is a seasonal loan fi)r the paymrtent o"
operating and living expenses during the course of'a growing season or production cycle. Generally.
these loans are repaid in full at harvest oir at the end of the cycle fromni the sales proceeds of the
commodity produced. The process is repeated during the next production cycle. FREY & BEHnRE-NS,
supra note 1, at 67. The operating loan is "p1rothably the motst cninmin flirin ,f agriculhural loan."

Id.
5. FREY & BEHRENS, supra note 1, at 67.
6. See In re Sunberg, 35 Bankr. 777 (Bankr. S.1). la. 1983), qaf'd. 72() l.2d 561 (81t (:i.
1984).
The security agreement in Sunbert tovered -existing or lierealic aiquired.,
gt c ral initangiblhs."

35 Batkr. at 561.
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loan with extensive collateral because the value of the collateral at
the start of the production cycle is typically low. 7 In addition, the

collateral position of the lender may change dramatically during the
term of the loan due to factors totally beyond the control of either
lender or borrower. The market value of the commodities may
fluctuate during the term of the loan. Wind, hail, rain, or drought
may destroy or severely damage, the crop, which is the security for
the loan. If a livestock loan is involved, the herd may be subject to
disease or breeding difficulties. Finally, the farmer may consume
part of the collateral in the normal operation of the farming
enterprise. The farmer may feed his livestock with harvested crops
that are on hand at the beginning of the production cycle while the
new crop is growing in the fields. In short, because of numerous
contigencies, "most lenders will require collateral valued at 20 to
50 percent in excess of the amount of the loan. "8
Perhaps in part because of the nature and breadth of the
security interest required by an operating lender, the typical farmer
will generally obtain all of his production money from one lender.
Lenders do not want to be in a position in which they must look to a
portion of the growing crop or livestock herd for security. If another
creditor has an interest in similar crops or livestock, difficult
problems of identification, control, and division of the sales
proceeds exist for both parties. If there is no other creditor, the
difficulties for the lender are not necessarily diminished because the
farmer may still intermingle the secured commodities with
unsecured commodities. Thus, most agricultural operating lenders
prefer to have the sole blanket security interest covering all of the
farmer's livestock and crops. As a result, the farmer must generally
look to a single lender for his vital operating funds.
Although an operating loan is traditionally conceived as being
a device for obtaining the necessary funds to acquire and feed
livestock or to plant and harvest crops, or both, it is not unusual for
a lender to use the operating loan to finance the acquisition of
equipment, implements, or machinery. Rather than make a
separate loan for these acquisitions, the lender considers the costs as
an operating expense for the production cycle involved in the loan. 9
Oftentimes, when the costs are considered in this manner, the
7. See FREY & BEHRENS, supra note 1, at 166-67. While livestock has a market value at all stages
of maturity, the value of a growing crop is minimal until it approaches maturity since an immature
crop cannot be converted to cash prior to harvest. Id. at 167.
8. i. at 167. The authors note, however, that the prudent creditor may protect himself by
purchasing insurance or requiring that the debtor do so. Id. at 215.
9. Id. at 67. Under an operating loan lenders "periodically [advance] funds for payment of
opetating and living expenses (luring the course of the growing season or livestock production
-vcl(."-Id.
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normal cash flow of the farming operation is incapable, at the
inception of the loan, of repaying the annual operating expenses,
interest, and equipment acquisition costs. In these situations, the
loan arrangement implicitly contemplates at least a partial
liquidation in the event of repayment difficulties. To secure the
equipment loans, the lender commonly obtains a security interest
in all equipment either owned at the time of the loan or acquired
later. 10 Thus, a single lender may have a security interest in
virtually all of the farmer's personal property. 1
In addition to having a blanket security interest in virtually all
of the farmer's personal property, the agricultural lender enjoys a
significant preference when his borrower disposes of the collateral
without either obtaining the consent of the lender or paying the
sales proceeds to the lender. Section 9-307(1) of the Uniform
Commercial Code provides that a buyer of farm products1 2 from a
person engaged in farming operations 13 obtains the commodity
with the operating lender's security interest firmly attached.' 4 This
rule is in contrast to the general rule of section 9-307(1), which
provides that a buyer in the ordinary course of business takes free
of a security interest created by his seller. 15 This statutory
protection, combined with the almost universal restrictions upon
disposition of collateral contained in the security agreement,
provides the operating lender with a substantial amount of
protection against unauthorized dispositions of livestock or
crops. 16 Buyers of secured farm products must either obtain the
10. See id. at 65. Using equipment as collateral is not necessarily limited to the lender who
finances the acquisition of the equipment. Id. An operating lender may well use the equipment as
collateral for a normal operating loan. Id.
11. For a case acknowledging a single lender's security interest in virtually all of the farmer's
personal property, see In re Sunberg, 35 Bankr. 777 (Bankr. S.D. Ia. 1983), aff'd, 729 F.2d 561 (8th
Cir. 1984).
12. See U.C.C. S 9-109(3) (1978). Section 9-109(3) defines farm products as follows:
[C]rops or livestock or supplies used or produced in farming operations or if they are
products of crops or livestock in their unmanufactured states (such as ginned cotton,
wool-clip, maple syrup, milk and eggs), and if they are in the possession of a debtor
engaged in raising, fattening, grazing or other farming operations. If goods are farm
products they are neither equipment nor inventory....
Id.
13. Courts have construed "farming operations" very broadly. See, e.g., In re K. L. Smith
Enter., 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 534, 539 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980) (egg production held
to be a lhrming operation); In re Blease, 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 450, 451-54 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1978) (veterinarian who bred and raised horses and raised corn was involved in farming
operations).
14. U.C.C. "9-307(1) (1978). Section 9-307(1) provides:
"A buyer in ordinary course of business (subsection (9) of Section 1-201) other
than a person buying farm products from a person engaged in farming operations
takes free of a security interest created by his seller even though the security interest is
perfected and even though the buyer knows of its existence."
Id. Thus, a person who has a security interest in farm products has a special status as a secured
creditor.
15. Id.
16.See Wabasso State Bank v. Caldwell Packing Co., 251 N.W.2d 321 (Minn. 1977). In
Caldwell Packing a farmer sold cattle that were covered by a security agreement. Because the farmer
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consent of the lender, issue checks jointly payable to the farmer and
lender, or run the risk of being held liable to the lender in a
1 7
subsequent conversion action.
The lender is further protected in many operating loan
situations by the nature of the farming operation itself. If the
borrower is a cash grain farmer, with minimal livestock, he will
generally market his crops only once per year. The reason for this,
of course, is that there is only one growing season which results in a
single crop for the year.
While this single marketing period offers the lender additional
protection against the unauthorized disposition of collateral, it also
presents the lender with a loan monitoring problem. If the lender
makes the operating loan in the early spring, with no possibility of
repayment until late autumn, the lender must closely monitor its
disbursements, the farmer's use of the funds under the loan, and
the extent, location, and value of the collateral. The lender's ability
to closely monitor the progress of the loan is crucial to the success of
the loan from the lender's point of view. Thus, these lenders must
follow the course of the borrower's business more closely than a
lender who is receiving payments on a regular basis. The lender
may achieve this monitoring in any of several ways. The lender, or
an affiliate, may keep the borrower's books and records and thus be
able to monitor all disbursements and income.' 8 The lender may
require that the farmer make all disbursements by a draft that
requires the lender's approval.'9 Also, the lender may require that
the farmer remit all sales proceeds to the lender who will apply
them to the loan. The lender then commonly will make a living
20
allowance in the form of a disbursement on the loan.
If the lender determines that a particular loan is likely to cause
collection difficulties, he may classify it as a "problem loan." A
problem loan is defined as "one in which there is a major
breakdown in the repayment agreement resulting in an undue
delay in collection, in which it appears that legal action may be
required to effect collection, or in which there appears to be a
potential loss." ' 2' If the lender classifies a loan as a problem loan,
had previously sold cattle without objection by the secured creditor, the buyer of the cattle claimed
that the security interest did not survive the sale. Id. at 322. The Supreme Court of Minnesota held
that the express terms of the security agreement could not be circumvented by a prior course of
dealing and, therefore, the security interest was not extinguished by the sale. Id. at 325.
17. Id. at 324.
18.See FREY & BEHRENS, supra note 1, at 172-73. The authors suggest that lenders closely
monitor their debtor's finances. Id.
19. See id. Bank-lenders can easily examine checks that clear their borrower's accounts. Id.
20. See id. at 67. The authors note that under operating loans lenders periodically advance funds
for living expenses. Id.
21. Id.at 210-11. The authors implore lenders to constantly scrutinize delinquent loans to
determine whether they are problem loans. Id. at 211.
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the monitoring activities of the lender will increase. The lender may
impose additional restrictions upon the borrower that may require
that the borrower reduce his living expenses, provide additional
collateral, or dispose of certain assets. There is no doubt that the
22
lender's primary concern will be the protection of his interest.
The lender may strive to avoid expressing concerns to other
creditors for fear that concern may trigger collection efforts on the
part of the other creditors that could have an adverse effect upon
the operating lender. 23 If the borrower is cooperative, he will
24
generally consent to the actions suggested by the lender.
As a general rule, a creditor may use his bargaining position,
including his ability to refuse to make additional loans, to improve
his position and the collectibility of his loan. 25 The creditor may call
a loan when due, refuse to extend a loan with or without cause, and
lawfully enforce collection. 26 However, when a creditor "exercises
such control over the decision-making processes of the debtor as
amounts to a domination of its will, he may be held accountable for
his actions under a fiduciary standard. ' 127
III. LENDER CONTROL OVER THE DEBTOR
In response to a creditor's attempts to improve his position,
several commentators have strongly advised creditors to avoid
becoming overly involved in the debtor's management. 28 While it is
possible that a creditor may be classified as a fiduciary as a result of
22. Id. at 219. The authors acknowledge that "[pjrotection of the creditor's interest must be the
prime consideration in the formulation of any plan for correction." Id.
23. Id. at 217. The authors recognize, however, that lenders may contact the debtor's other
creditors in an effort to determine the interests of each. Id.
24. Id,at 218. Truly cooperative borrowers will often consent to the often unpleasant conditions
of correction programs. Id. These borrowers apparently recognize that they will benefit if the
correction program is successful. Id. at 219.
25. See, e.g., In re Grant Co., 699 F.2d599, 610 (2d Cir. 1983) (bank-creditors increased money
lent to debtor for which they took additional security interests in an attempt to prevent debtor's
rumored intention to file bankruptcy petition); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 78-79 (2d Cir.
1982) (no fraud existed when bank and its corporate borrower entered into arm's length transaction);
In re Prima Co., 98 F.2d 952, 965 (7th Cir. 1938) (debtor's acquiescence to creditor's
recommendations was not sufficient to constitute creditor's domination of debtor's will even when
debtor was financially unable to meet its obligations without creditor's assistance); In re Teltronics
Scrvs., Inc., 29 Bankr. 139, 172 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983) (arm's length agreement required debtor
to purchase various equipment from the creditor and limited the debtor's ability to obtain additional
secured financing at a level predetermined by the creditor).
26. See In re Teltronics Servs., Inc., 29 Bankr. at 170 (creditor lawfully restricted debtor's ability
to obtain additional secured financing).
27. Id.
28. See Douglas-Hamilton, CreditorLiabilities Resultingrrom Improper Interference with the Management
of a Financially TroubledDebtor, 31 Bus. LAW. 343 (1975). The commentator concludes "that whenever
a creditor interferes in the business affairs of a finaiicially troubled corporate debtor, it risks the
possibility that such interference may provide a basis for the equitable adjustment of its claims
against the debtor, the imposition of statutory liabi!ity or the imposition of liabilities at common
law." Id. at 365.
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excessive control of the debtor, no court or commentator has yet
been able to put forth a precise definition of "control." Rather, it
appears that no simple rule or formula of what constitutes control
exists because the existence of a control relationship "necessarily
depends on the cumulative impact of the facts and circumstances of
the particular case.''29 As a result, one can only speculate
concerning the factors that a court, when faced with a challenge to
the actions of an agricultural operating lender, will consider
determinative.
There appears to be no reason why a court could not look to
other areas of the law for guidance in defining the parameters of a
control relationship. 30 Control has been an issue in cases under the
Interstate Commerce Act, 3' the Federal Aviation Act, 32 and the
Internal Revenue Code. 3 In addition, there is a substantial body of
securities case law concerning the question of control, 3 4 even
though the Securities Act of 193335 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 193436 do not contain definitions of "control." However, the
Securities Exchange Commission has promulgated a rule under the
1934 Act that defines control as "the possession, direct or indirect,
of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and
policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting
For discussions of creditor involvement with debtor management, see Koch, Bankruptcy Planning
for the Secured Lender, 99 BANKINC L.J. 788 (1982); Committee on Dev. in Bus. Fin., Structuring and
Documenting Business Financing Transactions Under theFederalBankruptcy Code of 1978, 35 Bus. LAW. 1645
(1980); Bartlett & Lapatin, The Status of a Creditoras a 'ControllingPerson,' 28 MERCER L. REV. 639
(1977).
29. Koch, supra note 28, at 798.
30. See Enstam & Kamen, Control and the Institutional Investor, 23 Bus. LAW. 289 (1968). The
commentators discuss "many federal statutes in which control is mentioned and in which its
existence brings into play various legal consequences." Id. at 291, 291-97. They also discuss nonstatutory applications of the statutory control concepts. Id. at 297-301.
31. 49 U.S.C. § 5(4) (1982). See Gilbertville Trucking Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 115
(1962). In Gilbertville the Court noted that S 1(3)(b) of the Transportation Act of 1940 defined control
'to include actual as well as legal control, whether maintained or exercised through or by reason of
the Iiiethod of or circumstances surrounding organization or operation... . .
Id. at 125. See
Transportation Act of 1940 § 1(3)(b), 49 U.S.C. 10102(6) (1976 & Supp. V).
32. 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (1982). See Toolco-Northeast Control Case, 42 C.A.B. 822 (1965). In
Toolco the Civil Aeronautics Board indicated that control "is a question of fact to be determined by
weighing the evidence in each case, and drawing reasonable inferences and conclusions therefrom in
the light of the objectives and purposes of the Act." Id. at 825.
33. See Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. United States, 616 F.2d 1181, 1185-86 (10th Cir. 1980). In
Iidelity Bank the court discussed the degree of control that a lender must exercise over a borrower
before the court would find liability under the I.R.C. S 6672. Id. at 1185-86. See I.R.C. S 6672 (West
1983) (penalty for willfully failing to collect and account for withholding taxes).
34. See, e.g., Ayers v. Wolfinbarger, 491 F.2d 8, 14 (5th Cir. 1974) (control does not exist in
securities context when "stock is simply pledged as security for deferred payments, and particularly
where the reinstatement provision after default is so favorable to the purchaser"); Koppers United
Co. v. SEC, 138 F.2d 577, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1943) (facts indicated that control did not exist when the
parties arrived at a business agreement by bargaining at arm's length); In re Clearfield Bituminous
Coal Corp., 1 S.E.C. 374 (1936) (applicant that owned all the securities of a public utility company
did not control the utility because the applicant had effectively assigned its power to control). For a
discussion of securities cases and creditor control see Douglas-Hamilton, supra note 28, at 352-63.
35. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1982).
36. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. S 78a (1982).
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securities, by contract, or otherwise. ",3" Thus, it would appear that a

court which must rule on the issue of control can benefit greatly
from examining cases in these other areas for purposes of
38
analogy.
While it may be very difficult for a court to determine if, in
fact, a creditor has so dominated a debtor as to control him, there is
support for the proposition that a court may find creditor control in
the mere ability to dominate. 39 The rationale for the concept of
"latent control" is that:
the prudent debtor can be expected to act with
considerable deference toward a potentially dominant
lender, even though that lender may not have actually
pounded the debtor into submission. If the . . . courts

endorse the latent control theory, a lender must consider
the possibility that loan agreements containing excessively
restrictive and oppressive conditions may evidence lender
control. Moreover, because the exercise of actual control is
difficult to prove, the existence of such an oppressive loan
40
agreement could tip the scale in a close case.
Two recent bankruptcy court opinions appear to have adopted
this latent control theory. In In re T.E. Mercer Trucking Co. 41 the

court considered a creditor's motion for summary judgment. In
denying the motion for summary judgment, the court considered
the "remarkable loan contracts" involved and concluded that "the
extensive creditor control evidenced by the loan agreement suggests
that the debtor corporations were mere instrumentalities or the
42
alter ego" of the creditor.
37. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b (1983) (emphasis added).
38. See Koch, supra note 28, at 798-99. See also Queenan, The Prqference Provisions of the Pending
IBakzrtpv lawv, 82 CoM. L.J. 465, 470 (1977). Queenan notes that conversations with the members
.f
c salafflf the House of Representatives indicated that the concept of control in the context of
debtor-creditor relations was to be as broad as that which "is employed in the securities laws." Id.
But see Committee on Dev. in Bus. Fin., supra note 28, at 1663 & n.90. The article warns
"bankruptcy courts [to] resist the temptation to look to securities law cases for guidance in
c( nstruing [control] because of the different policy considerations and concerns underlying... the
Code as compared with the securities laws." Id. at 1663.
39. See Gilbertville Trucking Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 115, 125 (1962) (control includes
power to control regardless of whether exercised); Detroit Edison Co. v. SEC, 119 F.2d 730, 739 (6th
Cir. 1941) (control may exist based upon latent power to resume actual control); In re M.A.
Hanna Co., 10 S.E.C. 581, 588 (1941) (control is "less than absolute and complete domination of
company").
40. Koch, supra note 28, at 799 (emphasis in original).
41. 16 Bankr. 176 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981).
42. In re T.E. Mercer Trucking Co., 16 Bankr. 176, 190 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981). In Mercer
7ruckin! the creditor required the debtors to "recognize, admit and affirm all of [their] foregoing
indebltedness owing by them, individually, jointly or severally to [the creditor]." Id. at 184. The
debtors also allowed the creditor to undertake and order liquidation of the debtors' corporation as a
part of the loan agreement. Id.
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Similarly, in In re Teltronics Services, Inc., 43 the court carefully
analyzed several creditor control cases and concluded:
a non-insider creditor will be held to a fiduciary standard
only where his ability to command the debtor's obedience to
his policy directives is so overwhelming that there has
been, to some extent, a merger of identity. Unless the
creditor has become, in effect, the alter ego of the debtor,
he will not be held to an ethical duty in excess of the
4
morals of the market place.
Courts, and parties in their arguments to the court, have cited
4 5
several factors indicating that a lender was in control of a debtor.
While no single factor is determinative, consideration of the
combined effect of these factors will assist courts in determining
whether a creditor has assumed control of the financially distressed
debtor.
A.

FINANCIAL DEPENDENCE

The mere fact that a financially troubled debtor is dependent
upon a lender is not, generally, sufficient alone to find that the
lender is exercising control over the debtor. 46 In In re Jefferson
Mortgage Co.,

47

a trustee in bankruptcy alleged that a lender exerted

control over the debtor and was therefore an "insider" within the
meaning of the Bankruptcy Code. 48 In addressing the trustee's
argument, the court stated that the lender:
43. 29 Bankr. 139 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983).
44. In re Teltronics Servs., Inc., 29 Bankr. 139, 171 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983) (emphasis added).
In Teltronics the bankruptcy trustee contended that a creditor of the bankrupt induced it to default
under a loan agreement thereby enabling the creditor to seize its collateral and take over the business
of the bankrupt. Id. at 143. The creditor responded that its conduct was not only lawful but also a
reasonable commercial practice. Id.
45. For a court's discussion of factors indicative of lender control of its debtor, see In rejefferson
Mortgage Co., 25 Bankr. 963 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1982). The court in Jefferson Mortgage considered the
90-day preference period, the concept of "insider," whether the parties' debtor-creditor relationship
was at arm's length, and the terms of the agreement before making its decision. Id. at 964-72.
While most creditor control cases involve corporate debtors, individual debtors have recently
utilized the creditor control challenge as well. See, e.g., Denison State Bank v. Madeira, 230 Kan.
684, __,
640 P.2d 1235, 1237-40 (1982) (debtor-depositor challenged creditor-bank); Umbaugh
Pole Bldg. Co. v. Scott, 50 Ohio St. 2d 282, __,
390 N.E.2d 320, 321-23 (1979) (debtor-farmers
challenged creditor-farmers' cooperative).
46. See Koch, supra note 28, at 798. The commentator notes that the existence of a control
relationship depends on the cumulative factors of each case. Id.
47. 25 Bankr. 963 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1982).
48. In rejefferson Mortgage Co., 25 Bankr. 963, 965 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1982). Section 101(25) of
the Bankruptcy Code provides as follows:
"[I]nsider" includes(A)
if the debtor is an individual(i) relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor;
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may have exercised some measure of control over the
debtor financially in order to protect its collateral.
However, this control was merely incident to their
creditor-debtor relationship. The creditor had only
financial power over the debtor, and the debtor could
have terminated the relationship at any time and looked
4 9
for another creditor.
As a result, the court held as a matter of law that the parties'
relationship was one of an arms' length debtor-creditor
relationship. 50
Similarly, in In re Yonkers Hamilton Sanitarium, Inc. 51 a trustee in
bankruptcy sought to recover allegedly preferential transfers made
by the debtor to the federal government under the Medicare
program. The trustee contended that the court should regard the
government and its fiscal intermediary, Blue Cross-Blue Shield, as
a person in control of the debtor based upon the debtor's financial
dependence on the revenues the debtor expected to be paid by the
government through Blue Cross. 52 The court concluded that, while
a debtor may be influenced by the demands of its major customers
or creditors, the influence was not the type of control contemplated
53
by the Bankruptcy Code.

partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
general partner of the debtor; or
corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or
person in control;
if the debtor is a corporation(i) director of the debtor;
(ii) officer of the debtor;
(iii) person in control of the debtor;
(iv) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(v) general partner of the debtor; or
(vi) relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person
in control of the debtor;
if the debtor is a partnership(i) general partner in the debtor;
(ii) relative of a general partner in, general partner of, or
person in control of the debtor;
(iii) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(iv) general partner of the debtor; or
(v) person in control of the debtor;
if the debtor is a municipality, elected official of the debtor or relative of
an elected official of the debtor;
affiliate, or insider of an affiliate as if such affiliate were the debtor; and
managing agent of the debtor.
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

(B)

(C)

(D)
(E)
(F)

11 U.S.C. S 101(25) (1976).
49. 25 Bankr. at 970.
50. Id.
51. 22 Bankr. 427 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
52. In reYonkers Hamilton Sanitarium, Inc., 22 Bankr. 427, 428-29 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
53. Id. at 430. The court rather woodenly applied the "definition" of'"insider" contained in 11
U.S.C. § 101(25)(B) to conclude that voting control was required to control a corporate debtor. Id.
Seealso In re Castillo, 7 Bankr. 135, 137 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980) (the same court that decidedYonkers
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When a lender is the sole available source of financing to a
financially troubled debtor, however, courts should be more
conscious of the potential for creditor control. 54 If the lender is the
debtor's only source of financial aid, one may infer that the prudent
debtor will be submissive to the lender's wishes. 55 Several courts, in
a variety of contexts, have found that the monopolistic control of a
debtor's sources of financing may be significant in finding that a
creditor has control of its debtor. In In re American Lumber Co. 56 the
court noted that because the lender was a debtor's "sole source of
credit," the debtor was "within the coercive power" of the
lender. 57 The, court recognized that the lender foreclosed on its
security interest in the debtor's accounts receivable, thereby.
depriving the debtor of the only source of ready cash with which to
conduct its business. 58 Prior to making any expenditures, therefore,
the debtor had to request and obtain a "loan" from the lender.
Thus, the court determined that the lender had "sought to
perpetrate a fraud upon the general unsecured creditors of [the
debtor]."59
Similarly, in A. GayJenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc. 60 the court
indicated that since a creditor provided all of the financing for a
rural elevator, the creditor had de facto control over the conduct of
the debtor. 6 1 While the court cited several factors in support of its
finding, it emphasized that the rural elevator "was financially
62
dependent on Cargill's continual infusion of capital." ,
Finally, in Toolco-Northeast Control Case63 the Civil Aeronautics
Board considered the financial distress of the debtor as well as the
applied a mechanical test in determining that the creditor was not an insider, ignoring that 11
U.S.C. S 101(25) is a nonexclusive list of insiders).
54. Koch, supra note 28, at 801 (citing In re American Lumber Co., 5 Bankr. 470 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1980)).
55. Koch, supra note 28, at 801.
56. 5 Bankr. 470 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980).
57. In re American Lumber Co., 5 Bankr. 470, 478 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980).
58. Id. In American Lumber the defendant bank loaned money to the bankrupt taking a security
interest in the bankrupt's accounts and contract rights, stock of the bankrupt, and real estate. Id. at
473. Upon default by the bankrupt, the bank foreclosed on the accounts receivable and contract
rights. The bank scrutinized each check drawn by the bankrupt and paid only those that would
enhance the value of the accounts receivable. The bank also forced the termination of most of the
bankrupt's employees and undertook to liquidate the bankrupt. Id. at 474.
59. Id. at 479. The bankruptcy court found that the bank's plan of liquidation was designed to
enhance the value of the property secured by the bank to the detriment of general unsecured
creditors. Id. at 477.
60. 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981).
61. A. GayJenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285, 291 (Minn. 1981). Injenson
Farms a grain elevator, Warren Grain & Seed Co. (Warren), defaulted on payments due to farmers
for the purchase of grain. Warren had secured financing from Cargill, Inc. for working capital. Id. at
288.
62. Id. at 292. Among the factors considered by the court were that Cargill's name was
imprinted on Warren's checks and drafts, Cargill financed all of Warren's purchases and operating
expenses, and Cargill had the power to discontinue financing of Warren's operations. Id. at 291.
63.42 C.A.B. 822 (1965).
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contributions of the lender in deciding that Hughes Tool Company
had retained control of Northeast Airlines, Inc. 64 In addition, in the
context of an agricultural operating loan, a lender who has a
security interest in all existing and after-acquired crops, livestock,
implements, tools, and equipment, and who provides all of the
farm operator's production money, may well possess the latent
65
power to control the farm debtor.

B.

RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

As a routine matter, an agricultural operating lender will
require that the borrower agree not to incur additional secured
66
debts or suffer any involuntary liens against the collateral.
Generally, the purpose of these restrictive covenants is to maintain
or improve the ratio between the debt and the assets that exist at the
time of the financing. 67 These restrictions, of course, restrict the
management of the farming operation and remove a certain
amount of freedom from the operator. It seems clear, however, that
a lender has a right to impose proper conditions upon the debtor to
enhance its security and increase the likelihood that it will be
repaid. 68
69
For example, in CanadairLtd. v. Seaboard World Airlines, Inc.
an aircraft manufacturer, Canadair Ltd. (Canadair), attempted to
enforce a restrictive covenant in the mortgages it held on the
aircraft it sold to an air carrier, Seaboard World Airlines
(Seaboard).7 0 Canadair sought to enforce a restriction limiting
capital investments and rent obligations in order to enjoin a lease
purchase agreement that Seaboard entered into with another
aircraft manufacturer. The issue before the court was whether the
restriction was invalid because it gave the manufacturer control

64. Toolco-Northeast Control Case, 42 C.A.B. 822, 827 (1965). The Civil Aeronautics Board
noted that Hughes Tool Co. (Toolco) was an essential source of financial aid to Northeast Airlines.
Id. Northeast Airlines, therefore, "necessarily continue[d] to rely upon Toolco for assistance." Id.
Thus, the Board concluded that Northeast had no choice but to 'defer to Toolco's wishes." Id.
65. See Douglas-Hamilton, supra note 28, at 361 (discussion of liability for creditor control under
federal securities law).
66. See FREY & BEHRENS, supra note 1, at 65-66. The authors indicate that lenders should avoid
having partial security interests in collateral in which creditors also have partial interests. Id. at 65.
67. Koch, supra note 28, at 799.
68. Id.
69. 43 Misc. 2d 320, 250 N.Y.S.2d 723 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
70. Canadair Ltd. v. Seaboard World Airlines, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 320, __, 250 N.Y.S.2d 723,
725-26 (Sup. Ct. 1964). In Conadair the court indicated that agreements between the parties
"Jelssentially... [constitued] chattel mortgage and equipment trust agreements." Id. at 725.
71. Id. Seaboard entered into a lease agreement with Douglas for the acquisition of an airplane.
The agreement provided that Seaboard would pay rent of $1,072,071 yearly for ten years. Id.
Seaboard's agreement with Canadair contained a provision prohibiting Seaboard from making
commitments in excess of $1,500,000 in any one year. Id. at 728-29.
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over the carrier without prior approval as required under section
408 of the Federal Aviation Act. 72 Canadair argued that these
agreements merely provided for ordinary debtor-creditor
protection and that the court should construe control to mean the
directing and running of a business. The court concluded that
administrative approval was not necessary, and that the restrictions
73
did not place Canadair in a position of control.
Under the securities laws, courts have held that the power to
veto the creation of liens and extraordinary debt does not amount
to control. 74 Likewise, the power to veto other extraordinary
corporate action is not control. 75 Should a court, however, find a
creditor in control of a debtor, any restrictive covenants,
particularly if they involve restrictions on management, personnel,
or production, may well provide evidence of the creditor's
control. 76
C.

CONTROL OVER DISBURSEMENTS

It may be particularly risky for a creditor to insist upon control
over its borrower's disbursements. Cases have addressed the
lender's liability when the lender has control over disbursements of
the borrower and have generally found that the lender was in
control of the debtor. 77 In In re Process-Manz Press, Inc. ,78 the
bankrupt debtor assigned all of its receivables to a creditor. The
creditor collected all proceeds and supplied all necessary funds for
the debtor's payroll and other expenses. 7 9 The court found that the
control the creditor exercised over the debtor was so pervasive that
the creditor was "in substance the owner" of the debtor. 80
72. Id. at 726. Section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act prohibits the acquisition of contirol of
any air carrier in any manner whatsoever" without approval of the Civil Aeronautics Board. Federal
Aviation Act § 408(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1378(a)(1958).
73. 43 Misc. 2(d at
250 N.Y.S.2d at 727. Subsect ion (b) of ' 1378 providts that a; party
seeking to)acquire control must obtain the approval of the Board. Id. at _
, 25f1 N.Y.S.2d at 727.
Srr 49 U.S.C. § 1378(b). The parties did not show that the control represent(I
requ itd hc Board to entertain.urisdiciion. Id. at __
, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 727.

by

iftc agrc

cis
'tt

74. For a discussion of voting and management control under corporate law, see DouglasHamilton, supra note 28, at 344-45.
75. Allied Chemical & Dye Corp., 5 S.E.C. 151 (1939) (company's veto power did tnot
constitute control under Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935).
76. See A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285, 288-89 (Minn. 1981)
(debtor-creditor agreements contained several substantial restrictions). But see In re Prima Co., 98
F.2d 952, 968 (7th Cir. 1938) (restrictive agreement insufficient to find control).
77. See Koch, supra note 28, at 805 (citing American Lumber).
78. 236 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Il. 1964), rev'don other grounds, 369 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967).
79, In reProcess-Manz Press, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 333, 337 (N.I). III. 1964), rev 'donother
l'rounid.
369 l.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967). It Proceo-MAanz 'ress tll('
claiimtant(
A.J. Arrtstrong Co. (Armstrong), loaned money to theIlankruptl taking a sccurily inrest i I I10%
(f'Il" stock of' the bankrupt andf an assignment of dw rccivabhls if' ie bankruilt. Armstrong
rcccivCd allthe income of the bankrupt and made advances to the bankrupt. Id. The Iankrupt was
ft tts
1epwndent solely on Armstrong fir its financial needs." 236 IF.SUllI).
at 339.
80. Id. at 348. The court referred to Armstrong as the "alter ego" of the bankrupt. Id.
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Likewise, in In re American Lumber Co. ,'" the court found that a
lender's foreclosure of its security interests in accounts receivable
and contract rights deprived the debtor of the only source of ready
cash with which to conduct its business. "Loans," therefore, were
necessary for every expenditure made by the debtor.8 2 The lender
determined which of the debtor's other creditors would be paid.
The creditor made sure that the only accounts paid were those that
the lender felt would improve its own position. Thus, the court
found that the lender was in control of the debtor. 83
If a lender feels that it must have this type of control, a mere
84
veto power over irregular expenditures would seem preferable.
Recently, in Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. United States,8 5 the IRS alleged
lender control when a bank honored checks drawn in excess of the
borrower's line of credit and retained authority to veto the
borrower's expenditures. In exercising this authority, a bank
officer examined all checks drawn on the borrower's account prior
to payment and honored any checks that appeared valid.8 6 Until it
declared the borrower in default and foreclosed its security interest,
87
the bank honored all checks drawn on the overdraft line of credit.
On these facts, the court determined that the bank was not in
control of the debtor because it had not initiated payment decisions
or decided which creditors to pay. 88 Even though the lender had
control of all the taxpayer's income and the taxpayer was totally
dependent upon the lender, the court was unwilling to find that the
lender had intruded into the financial operations aspect of the
debtor's business.

89

81.5 Bankr. 470 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980).
82. In re American Lumber Co., 5 Bankr. 470, 478 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980). The court in
American Lumber specifically noted that the creditor was the debtor's sole source of credit. Id. See supra
notes 56-59 and accompanying text for the facts of American Lumber.
83. Id. at 479. The court concluded that "[t]his kind of conduct cannot be allowed to prevail."
Id.
84. Koch, supra note 28, at 805.
85. 616 F.2d 1181 (10th Cir. 1980).
86. Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. United States, 616 F.2d 1181, 1183 (10th Cir. 1980). In Fidelity Bank
a construction company secured a revolving line of credit of $1,000,000 from a bank. After the
company had exceeded its $1,000,000 credit limit, the bank allowed the company to overdraw its
account to meet working capital needs under a construction contract with the Kiowa Housing
Authority (KHA). The bank would approve overdraft payments only if the payee was connected
with the KHA contracts. Id.
87. Id. Upon default by the borrower, the bank dishonored or returned all the borrower's
checks. Id. Among the dishonored and returned checks were checks the borrower issued to the IRS
for withheld payroll taxes. Id. at 1184. The IRS assessed a 100% penalty for the unpaid taxes against
the bank under S 6672 of the Internal Revenue Code, which imposes liability for unpaid taxes on any
person who is responsible for the collection and payment of payroll taxes but willfully fails to perform
these acts. Id. at 1185. See I.R.C. S 6672 (West 1983).
88. 616 F.2d at 1186. The court concluded that the jury could find that the bank was not a
"responsible person" within the meaning of § 6672. Id. The court, therefore, remanded the case on
this issue. Id.
89. Id. The court determined that the bank's actions were no more than arrangements by which
the bank made a series of loans to the debtor for specific purposes. Id. at 1185-86.
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It would be difficult to distinguish the case of an agricultural
operating lender who requires the borrower to remit all net
proceeds from~the sales of agricultural commodities to the lender
for application to the outstanding balance of the loan from the
situation in American Lumber and Process-Manz. This would be
particularly true if the lender issued drafts or required its approval
for the payment of other creditors. The agricultural lender who
insists upon these provisions in a loan agreement would thus
appear to incur a great deal of risk. An agreement of this type
would seem to result in the intrusion of the lender into the financial
and operational aspects of the debtor.
D.

OTHER RESTRICTIONS INDICATIVE OF CONTROL

When a debtor is experiencing financial pressure, it is
not uncommon for him to look to a lender for guidance. Debtors
often cite their subsequent following of the lender's
recommendations as evidence of a fiduciary relationship or
lender control of the business operation. 9" This may be
particularly true in the case of an agricultural operating loan in
which a lender has made strong suggestions or recommendations
concerning crop selection, marketing plans, or other management
decisions in an effort to work out a problem loan. In Umbaugh Pole
Building Co. v. Scott9' the farm debtor operated a hog farm. His
major operating lender was a local Production Credit Association.
As part of its regular servicing of the loan, the Association gave
advice and counseling to its debtors relative to their farming
operation. 92 When the debtor, the Association, and other lien
creditors became embroiled in a dispute, the debtor argued that the
advice and counseling that he received from the Association was
indicative of a fiduciary relationship. 93 The court rejected this
argument, holding that "[w]hile the advice was given in a
congenial atmosphere and in a sincere effort to help the [debtor]
prosper, nevertheless, the advice was given by an institutional
lender in a commercial context in which the parties dealt at arms
90. See Umbaugh Pole Bldg. Co. v. Scott, 58 Ohio St. 2d 282, 390 N.E.2d 320 (1979). While the
court indicated that debtor reliance upon the advice of his creditor may establish a fiduciary
relationship, the facts in the case before it "were insufficient to create a fiduciary relationship." Id. at
__
390 N.E.2d at 323.
91. 58 Ohio St. 2d 282, 390 N.E.2d 320 (1979).
92. Umbaugh Pole Bldg. Co. v. Scott, 58 Ohio St.2d 282, __,
390 N.E.2d 320, 321 (1979).
93. 390 N.E.2d at 322. Scott arose out of a mechanic's lien against the debtor for improvements
to his property. The lienor sued to foreclose on the lien. The debtor cross-complained against the
Association, alleging that the Association had wrongfully refused to advance funds to pay for the
improvements. Although the initial action involved a third-party lienor, the appeal concerned only
the rights of the debtor and the Association. Id.
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length, each protecting his own interest. ,94
In In re W. T. Grant Co. 9 5 certain debenture holders objected to
a proposed settlement by a trustee in bankruptcy. The debenture
holders contended that certain lenders had improperly used their
96
influence with the failing company to improve their own position.
Among the allegations by the debenture holders was that the banks
were running the company. 97 In response to this allegation the
court observed that:
There is no doubt that, at least from March of 1974, the
banks kept careful watch on what was going on at Grant;
they would have been derelict in their duty to their own
creditors and stockholders if they had not. It is not
uncommon in such situations for officers whose
companies have been brought to the verge of disaster to
think that they still have better answers than do the
outsiders. In order to establish their claims the appellants
must show not simply that the banks proffered advice to
Grant that was unpalatable to management, even advice
gloved with an implicit threat that, unless it were taken,
further loans would not be forthcoming. They must show
at least that the banks acted solely for their own
benefit ....

98

If a lender, such as an agricultural operating lender, is
providing all of the debtor's operating capital, a provision in a note
or loan agreement that renders the obligation payable on demand
or payable upon the lender's determination that it is "insecure"
would seem to be a factor that courts should consider in
94. Id. at 323. For additional cases in which courts have found that there was not a fiduciary
relationship between a lender and its borrowers, see Snow v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 309 Mass. 354,
35 N.E.2d 231 (1941) (no fiduciary relationship existed when plaintiff relied on bank president's
financial advice because plaintiff knew that bank would receive a profit from the advice); Stenberg v.
Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 307 Minn. 487, 238 N.W.2d 218 (1976) (bank that encouraged debtor to
expand its business and offered it an open line of credit was not a fiduciary).
95. 699 F.2d 599 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 89 (1983).
96. In re W. T. Grant Co., 699 F.2d 599, 603-04 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 89 (1983). In
Grant the debenture holders claimed that the bank lenders compelled the bankrupt to enter into
security agreements to secure payments due to the lenders, which adversely affected the bankrupt's
revenues. The banks also directed the bankrupt not to sell its receivables. Id. at 605. The creditors
claimed that the actions of the banks resulted in weakening the bankrupt to the creditors' detriment.
Id.
97. Id. at 610. The Second Circuit noted that the bankruptcy court made detailed findings that
included that " '[t]he bank claimants used their position of control over Grant's management to
prevent Grant from promptly seeking relief under the Bankruptcy Act ....... "Id. at 605 (quoting In
reW.T. Grant Co., 4 Bankr. 53, 61 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
98. 699 F.2d at 610. The debenture holders also contended that, because of the banks' alleged
misconduct, the banks' claims should have been subordinated to the debenture holders' claims. Id.
at 603-04. See infra notes 269-72 for a discussion of the subordination issue in Grant.
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determining whether a lender is in control. 99 A prudent debtor will
more readily comply with the demands of a lender because of the
creditor's power to call the loan virtually at will.100 The debtor
will be particularly willing to comply if the loan is secured by
virtually all of the debtor's personal property. 101
Similarly, if a corporate debtor's principal officer or
shareholder has personally guaranteed the debt owed to a lender,
the lender may well be in a position of controlling the corporate
debtor through the guarantor. It would seem that the guarantor's
of interest between
creates a community
agreement
the guarantor and the lender, assuring that the guarantor will
02
exercise his control over the debtor for the lender's benefit.
This would appear to be particularly true in the case of a secured
guarantee, in which a lender has obtained personally owned
property of the guarantor to secure the corporate obligation. These
provisions are not uncommon in the case of closely held family farm
corporations in which the major asset of the farming operation, the
land, is held by the shareholders of the operating corporation. 103
Requiring a corporate debtor to pledge its stock to the lender is
one more indication that the lender may be controlling the
debtor.10 4 This is particularly true if the loan agreement contains a
liberal default provision that would allow the lender to declare a
default and replace the debtor's management at will. 05 In American
Lumber the court appeared to indicate that a lender may be in
control of the debtor, even though the lender has not actually
exercised his default remedies, so long as the pledge agreement
grants the lender a right to declare a default. 0 6 In addition, the
Civil Aeronautics Board in Toolco-Northeast Control Case'07 held that
the debtor did not relinquish control merely because it gave up its
right to vote the debtor's stock in favor of an independent
99. See Koch, supra note 28, at 806-07.
100. Koch, supra note 28, at 806-07. See also Queenan, supra note 38, at 470. For a court's
discussion of facts and circumstances establishing that a creditor's power to call in its debtor's loans
at will prompted the debtor to comply with the creditor's demands, see A. Gay Jenson Farms Co.v.
Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285, 291-93 (Minn. 1981).
101. Queenan, supra note 38, at 470. The commentator suggests that the more collateral a
creditor has as security the more likely a debtor will succumb to the demands of the creditor. Id.
102. See Koch, supra note 28, at 803-04; Queenan, supra note 38, at 470.
103. See FREv & BEHRENS, supra note 1, at 196. The authors acknowledge that "[e]xperience
indicates that the best co-obligor is one who has a personal interest in the success of the borrower's
venture ...... Id.
104. Koch, rupranote 28, at 802-03.
105. Id. The commentator notes, however, that "Ithe bankruptcy risks inherent in stock
pledges will, in most cases, outweigh the benefits to be derived therefrom." Id. at 803.
106. In re American Lumber Co., 5 Bankr. 470, 478 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980). For a discussion
of the pledge agreement in American Lumber see Koch, supra note 28, at 803.
107. 42 C.A.B. 822 (1965).
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trustee.1 0 8 These cases suggest that the mere taking of a stock
pledge to secure the repayment of a loan, by itself, does not create a
control relationship. If any of the other factors discussed above are
also present, however, especially if the same lender is the debtor's
sole source of financial support, a stock pledge may well prove
persuasive to a court called upon to address the control issue. 109
In summary, a court may find any combination of factors
significant in determining whether an agricultural lender has taken
control of the farm. A court, therefore, should not base its decision
upon any single factor, but rather, on the cumulative effect of such
matters. In addition, the context in which a debtor or other party
raises the creditor control issue may well be significant in
determining whether the lender is subject to liability.
IV. CHALLENGES TO CREDITOR CONTROL
The issue of creditor control of a debtor may arise in a variety
of situations. The debtor himself may challenge the creditor either
by means of using creditor control as a defense in a suit to collect
the loan made by the lender or as the basis for a complaint in a suit
initiated by the borrower.110 In addition to the lender and debtor,
third parties, principally other creditors, may raise the issue of
creditor control in an attempt to collect the amount that a
financially distressed borrower owes them. Finally, the issue of
creditor control may be raised if the borrower has filed a
bankruptcy petition.
Two challenges to creditor control are likely in bankruptcy
cases. The trustee may allege that as a result of control, the lender
has become an "insider" within the meaning of the Code, 12 and as
a result, has received preferential transfers within the one year
period immediately preceding the filing of the bankruptcy
petition. 113 The creditor's claim, which it has filed in the
bankruptcy proceedings, may also be challenged by the trustee or
108. Toolco-Northeast Control Case, 42 C.A.B. 822, 830. In Toolco-Northeast Hughes Tool
Co. attvmpted to divest itself of control of Northeast Airlines by transferring its interest in Northeast
ioa irust. For a discussion ofthe pledge agreement in Too/to, see Koch, supra note 28, at 802-03.
109. See Koch, supra note 28, at 803.
110. See generally Koch, supra note 28; Queenan, supra note 38.
I I. See., enerally Koch, supra note 28; Queenan, supra note 38. Section 548 of the Bankruptcy
Code, which prohibits fraudulent transfers by debtors, provides an additional attack on the propriety
of creditor actions. See II U.S.C. § 548 (1982).
112. Section 101(25) of the Bankruptcy Code defines "insider." See supra note 48 for the text of
101(25).
113. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(2)(B) (1982). Section 547(b)(2)(B) prohibits preferential transfers by
the debtor within one year preceding the filing of bankruptcy. Id.
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other creditors due to the creditor's control under section 510(c) of
the Code. Section 510(c) provides that the bankruptcy court may,
"under principles of equitable subordination," subordinate all or
any part of an allowed claim. 114 The context in which a party raises
the issue will likely be very important in determining if the lender is
subject to liability.
A.

BORROWER V. LENDER

In numerous cases, a lender's customer has challenged the
lender on grounds of negligence, fraud, or contract alleging that a
fiduciary relationship existed between the parties based upon the
actions of the lender. As a general rule, however, the relationship
between a lender and its borrower is that of creditor-debtor and not
of a fiduciary.' 1 5 Thus, a lender has no special duty to counsel the
borrower or to inform the borrower of material facts relating to the
transaction unless special circumstances exist.
In Klein v. First Edina National Bank," 6 a bank customer
brought suit to recover stock that she had pledged as security for a
loan by the bank to a third party. The customer claimed that a loan
officer concealed certain facts which, if brought to her attention,
may have kept her from pledging the stock. According to the
customer's testimony, she was unaware at the time of the loan that
the third party, her employer, already owed the bank a significant
sum of money that was secured by an assignment of a particular
account owed the employer. 17 Apparently, the bank's intention
was to release that account as a result of the new loan and to rely
entirely upon the plaintiff's stock for security. 1 8 The customer,
according to her testimony, relied upon the loan officer to look after
her interests "as she would trust a doctor or lawyer."" 9 The court
found that the customer did not show that the bank stood in a
confidential relationship to her. The record contained no evidence
114. 11 U.S.C. 510(c)(1) (1982).
115. See Umbaugh Pole Bldg. Co. v. Scott, 58 Ohio St.2d 282, __
, 390 N.E.2d 320, 323
(1979) (debtor-creditor relationship is not a fiduciary relationship).
116. 293 Minn. 418 196 N.W.2d 619 (1972).
117. Klein v. First Edina Nat'l Bank, 293 Minn. 418, 420, 196 N.W.2d 619, 620-21 (1972).
118. Id., 196 N.W.2d at 621. The bank applied part of the loan proceeds to retire a previous
loan to the employer, which was secured by a receivable. Id. The bank officer assumed that the
employer would use the proceeds from the receivable to repay the later loan. By 1966 the bank
learned that the receivable had been paid in full, but did not call the loan until 1968. Because the loan
was secured, the bank "considered itself under no obligation to keep tabs on... the account." Id.,
196 N.W.2d at 622.
119. Id. at 421, 196 N.W.2d at 622. The bank customer claimed that the bank committed fraud
in taking the customer's stock as security. The customer was an alcoholic, had marital problems,
and, at the time of the loan transactions, was in a highly emotional state. Id. at 420-21, 196 N.W.2d
at 621-22. The customer testified that she would not have signed the loan instruments if someone
other than the banker had put the papers before her to sign. Id. at 421, 196 N.W.2d at 622.
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to indicate that the bank should have known that its customer was
placing her trust and confidence in it and was depending upon it to
look out for her interest. 120 Since no confidential relationship
121
existed, the court affirmed a directed verdict in favor of the bank.
Similarly, in Denison State Bank v. Madeira,122 the buyer of an
automobile dealership defended an action for collection of certain
promissory notes executed and delivered to a bank on the ground
that the lender had breached its fiduciary duty in failing to disclose
certain financial matters of the seller prior to the sale. 123 The court
held that the bank was not under a duty to disclose the financial
information since the bank did not use the information to its own
benefit at the expense of the buyer. Also, the allegedly concealed
information was either a matter of public record or was otherwise
readily available if the buyer had utilized some effort to discover the
information. 124 While the buyer testified that he trusted and relied
upon the bank to furnish him with complete, honest information,
2 5
this was not enough to establish a fiduciary relationship. 1
This is not to say that a customer can never establish a
fiduciary relationship with the lender, but only that to do so may be
extremely difficult. A borrower successfully established a fiduciary
relationship in Richfield Bank & Trust Co. v. Sjogren. 126 In Richfield
Bank a borrower purchased air purification units from National
Pollution Eliminators,
Inc. (National
Pollution). 127
The
president of National Pollution suggested that financing for the
purchase could be arranged through the Richfield Bank. The
borrower obtained the funding from the Richfield Bank. 12 8
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

120, Id. 421-22, 196 N.W. 2d at 623. The plaintiffhad been a customer of the defendant-bank
for nearly 20 years before the date she pledged her stock. Id. The court held that this fact alone could
not place the bank in a confidential relationship with the customer. Id.
121. Id. at 423, 196 N.W.2d. at 623.
122. 230 Kan. 684, 640 P.2d 1235 (1982).
123. Denison State Bank v. Madeira, 239 Kan. 684,
-, 640 P.2d 1235, 1237 (1982). In
l)enison State Bank the defendant invested in an automobile dealership. The defendant borrowed the
JIcessary funding and executed promissory notes to a bank. The dealership was heavily indebted to
the bank. Id. at
-_, 640 P.2d at 1238. The dealership had an overdraft of $5,000 in its account
with the bank and had outstanding $15,000 in drafts due to the bank. Id. The dealership also pledged
General Motors Corporation rebates to a third party. Id. at -,
640 P.2d at 1238-39. The
def'lndant expected to receive the rebates as part of the return of his initial investment. Id. at
640 P.2d at 1239.
124. Id. at __
640 P.2d at 1243. The court noted that the overdraft, the drafts, and the pledge
of the rebates would probably be reflected in an examination of the dealership's records. Id. at -,
64(1 P.2d at 1239. The defendant testified that he had full access to the dealership's financial records.
Id. at-._, 640 P.2d at 1238.
125. Id. at
, 640 P.2d at 1243. The court noted that "[iln the instant case, we are not faced
with a situation where a party with superior knowledge used that knowledge to its own benefit ...
IThe defendant] is fully competent and able to protect his own interests." Id. at
-, 640 P.2d at
1243-44.
126. 309 Minn. 362, 244 N.W.2d 648 (1976).
127. Richfield Bank & Trust Co. v. Sjogren, 309 Minn. 362, 363, 244 N.W.2d 648, 649 (1976).
TIhe purchase contract in Richfield Bank provided that National Pollution would install the units in
various business establishments and the borrower would collect rents and service the units. The
borrower was satisfied with the results of the transaction and decided to expand the business by
purchasing additional units. Id.
128. Id. The borrower decided to make the purchase and obtained the necessary funds from the
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National Pollution was insolvent and unable to deliver the
purification units. Both the officers of National Pollution and the
loan officer of the bank knew that the units were not available at the
time of the loan. More significantly, however, the loan officer with
whom the borrower dealt was also the only bank officer who
handled the National Pollution account, was listed by National
Pollution as its credit reference, had personally loaned National
Pollution "$7,000 or $8,000," and had received fringe benefits
from National Pollution.12 9 The court found that the loan officer
was an active participant in the daily affairs of the company. 130
Based upon these facts, the court found that the bank was under a
duty to inform its customer of the "fraudulent activities" of
National Pollution before it made a loan that "furthered the
fraud. ",131
The Klein and Madeira cases illustrate the reluctance of the
courts to impose a fiduciary relationship upon a transaction when
the parties neither intended nor anticipated one. Whether a
relationship exists depends upon the facts and circumstances of
each individual case. If a borrower seeks to establish a fiduciary
relationship between his lender and himself, he will have a very
heavy burden in overcoming the strong presumption that appears
to exist in favor of characterizing transactions between a lender and
its customers as arm's length transactions.
B.

CREDITORS v.

LENDER

In addition to facing challenges from its borrowers, a lender
who assumes control of a debtor's business runs the additional risk
of answering to the debtor's other creditors. In addressing the
creditor control issue in this context, it is helpful to carefully
examine two cases, with differing results, for the purpose of
analyzing the creditors' actions.
In Krivo Industrial Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chemical
Corp. ,132 ten creditors of a specialized machine products company
brought an action against the major creditor of the machine
Richfield Bank, giving the bank a security interest in real estate and in the units. The borrower had
never before done business with the Richfield Bank and did not inquire into the financial condition of
National Pollution. Id. at 364, 244 N.W.2d at 649.
129. Id. at 364-65, 244 N.W.2d at 650.
130. Id. The court found that the loan officer "was described by one of the employees of
National Pollution as calling all the shots for National Pollution from February or March, 1972,
onward, as being involved in just about everything that happened on a day-to-day basis in that
company.- Id.at 365, 244 N.W.2d at 650.
131. Id. at 369, 244 N.W.2d at 652. The court limited its holding to "the uniquc and narrow
.special circumstances' of this case, in which the bank had actual knowledge of thc Ifratdulntl activilitcs
of one of its depositors ....- Id. (emphasis supplied by court).
132. 483 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1973).
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company for the amount the company owed them. The alleged
liability of the creditor, National Distillers & Chemical Corp.
(National Distillers), was predicated upon the rule that when one
corporation controls and dominates another corporation to the
extent that the second corporation becomes the "mere
instrumentality" of the first, the dominant corporation becomes
liable for the debts of the subservient corporation attributable to an
133

abuse of that control.

In setting forth the "instrumentality" theory, the court began
with the general rule that "the mere loan of money by one
corporation to another does not automatically make the lender
liable for the acts and omissions of the borrower.

' 134

If the rule

were contrary, no lender would be willing to extend credit since the
risks and liabilities would be too great. However, "[i]f a lender
becomes so involved with its debtor that it is in fact actively
managing the debtor's affairs, then the quantum of control
necessary to support liability under the 'instrumentality' theory
may be achieved.1 13

5

To establish the requisite control, a party

must show that the creditor assumed actual, participatory, and
total control of the debtor. 136 In addition, for a court to find liability
based upon the "instrumentality" theory, a party must show that
the dominant corporation was using the subservient corporation to
further the purpose of the dominant corporation and that the
subservient corporation in reality had no separate, independent
existence of its own. 137 Finally, the instrumentality rule requires
that fraud or injustice proximately result from a misuse of control
by the dominant corporation.

138

Having established this as its test, the court turned to the facts.
Brad's Machine Products, Inc. (Brad's) was a California
corporation that began as a machine shop. It was owned by John
Bradford and his wife Nola. His machinery operation in California
proved profitable and he saw potential further profits in the
munitions industry. In the mid-1960's Brad's obtained a
government contract for the production of fuses. 139 Bradford's skills
133. Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th
Cir. 1973). The court in Krivo noted that courts will disregard the corporate form "to affix liability
where it justly belongs."

Id.

at 1103. See W.

FLETCHER,

CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE

CORPORATIONS § 43 (1983 rev. ed.). A growing class of cases disregard the corporate entity when
another corporation conducts its affairs as though the entity is a mere conduit or instrumentality. Id.
134. 483 F.2d at 1104.
135. Id. at 1105.
136. Id. Seealso Bakerv. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 656 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1981) (to pierce corporate
veil, parent's control must be actual, participatory, and total).
137. 483 F.2d at 1105-06.
138. Id. at 1106. The court emphasized that liability under the instrumentality rule did not
depend upon an intent to defraud. Id.
139. Id. at 1107. Brad's obtained a $2.7 million contract from the government for the
production of fuses. Id.
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as a machinist enabled him to develop a very efficient and unique
system for manufacturing the fuse bodies. The new technique
apparently revolutionized the manufacture of that particular fuse
140
body.
Following the acquisition of the government contract, Brad's
appeared to prosper. Bradford's other investments, however, soon
became a severe drain on Brad's operation. 14 1 By the late 1960's
Brad's was experiencing financial distress. As a result of this
distress, Brad's turned to its principal source of supply, Bridgeport
42
Brass Co. (Bridgeport), a division of National Distillers for help. 1
Bridgeport, at the request of Brad's, agreed to convert an arrearage
of approximately $1,000,000 to a promissory note, which was
secured by certain real estate as well as the personal guarantees of
Bradford and his wife. Despite the conversion of Bridgeport's open
account balance into an installment payment obligation, Brad's
continued to experience financial difficulties. In an effort to once
again shore up his company, Bradford met with National Distillers.
National Distillers agreed to loan Brad's additional money, defer
payment on accounts receivable, help Brad's and Bradford
liquidate unprofitable holdings to provide more capital, provide
''internal financial management assistance," and intervene with
the government to prevent cancellation of the existing fuse
contract. 143 As security, National Distillers obtained a real estate
mortgage on Brad's plant and a security agreement covering the
plant's furniture and fixtures. In addition, Brad's and Bradford
personally assigned various other assets to National Distillers for
purposes of liquidation.1 4 4 To help the financial management,
National Distillers sent one of its internal auditors to Brad's plant
to establish control procedures for managing cash and investments.
Finally, National Distillers worked with Brad's to dispose of the
assets assigned to National Distillers and other assets not so
assigned. National Distillers agreed that any income or proceeds
from the unassigned assets would be used for purposes of aiding
Brad's other creditors first. 14 5 Despite the efforts of Brad's
Bradford, and National Distillers, Brad's ceased its operations in
140. Id.

141. Id. Bradford's investments included a quarter horse, racing boats, airplanes, a bar, a
motel, orange groves, oil wells, and a motion picture company. Id. One of Brad's subsidiaries lost
over a million dollars in the late 1960's. Id.
142. Id. By 1969 Bridgeport was shipping $400,000 to $500,000 worth of brass rods to Brad's
every month. Id.
143. Id. The Defense Contract Administration threatened to cancel its contract with Brad's if
Brad's financial condition worsened. Id. at 1108.
144. Id. at 1108. Brad's and Bradford assigned captial stock in other corporations, oil and gas
leases, and all the stock of Bradford's motion picture company to National Distillers. Id.
145. Id. at 1108-09. Ifthe proceeds were more than Brad's other creditors required, they "either
would revert to Brad's or to Bradford or would belong to National Distillers outright." Id. at 1109.
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1970. Brad's creditors brought suit against National Distillers
seeking payment of Brad's unpaid debts. 146
Brad's creditors argued that National Distillers had in fact
assumed control of Brad's. 14 7 The court, however, found that
National Distillers' activities were "narrowly restricted to
safeguarding its interests as a major creditor" and that it
participated in the corporate decision-making only to a limited
degree. 14 8 With regard to the auditor supplied by National
Distillers, the court noted that his powers were essentially
"negative in character."1 49 Only those decisions having immediate
effect on Brad's financial position-were subject to the auditor's
attention. In that regard, the auditor had merely a veto power even
though all checks from Brad's account required his signature. The
court found that the auditor was never substantially involved in
personnel or production decisions. 150
With regard to the creditors' argument that control existed by
virtue of National Distillers' supervision of the liquidation of
various assets, the court found that National Distillers made the
final decision with regard to the disposition of the assets. The
assets, however, had been assigned to National Distillers for just
5
that purpose. ' '
The court found that, although National Distillers had the
power to exert great influence on Brad's, the power was insufficient
that Brad's was not an
to constitute control. The court concluded
52
instrumentality of National Distillers. 1
In contrast to Krivo is A. GayJenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc. ,151
which arose following the financial collapse of a Minnesota grain
elevator. Eighty-six farmers brought the action seeking to recover
losses sustained when the elevator, Warren Seed & Grain Co.
146. Id.
147. Id. The plaintiff-creditors alleged that National Distillers' majority ownership of Brad's
stock constituted the control requisite for a finding of liability. Id.
148. Id. at 1110.
149. Id. at 1111. The court noted that the auditor merely monitored finances and helped "fend
off aggressive, unhappy creditors." Id.
150. Id.at 1112.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1114. The court concluded, finding that:
Although National Distillers' position as a major creditor undoubtedly vested it with
the capacity to exert great pressure and influence, we agree with the District Court
that such a power is inherent in any creditor-debtor relationship and that the existence
and exercise of such a power, alone, does not constitute control for the purpose of the
Plaintiffs had to show the exercise of that control in the
"instrumentality" rule ....
actual operation of the debtor corporation.

153. 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981).
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(Warren), defaulted on the contracts it made with the farmers for
the sale of grain. 154 The farmers premised the action upon an
agency theory.
Section 14 0 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency provides
that a creditor who assumes control of the debtor's business may
become liable for the debtor's business transactions. 51 5 In addition,
comment a to section 14 0 provides that when a security holder
takes over the management of the debtor's business either in person
or through an agent, he becomes liable as a principal for the
obligations incurred by the business after the take over. 1 56 The
plaintiffs also relied upon section 14 K, which provides that one
who contracts to acquire property from a third person and convey it
to another is the agent of the other "if it is agreed that he is to act
primarily for the benefit of the other and not for himself. "'15 The
court concluded that Cargill was, in fact, the principal responsible
to the farmers for the breached grain contracts. 5 8 In reaching this
conclusion, the court carefully reviewed the historic relationship
between Warren and Cargill.
The relationship began in 1964 when Cargill agreed to lend
money to Warren on an "open account" basis up to a maximum of
$175,000. Under this original contract Warren received funds and
paid its expenses by issuing drafts drawn on Cargill through
Minneapolis banks. Warren deposited its sale proceeds with
Cargill and Cargill credited Warren's account. In return for this
financing, Warren appointed Cargill as its grain agent for
transactions with the Commodity Credit Corporation. Cargill also
received the right of first refusal to purchase market grain sold by
Warren to the terminal market. The parties negotiated a new
contract in 1967 that extended Warren's credit line to $300,000.
This later contract specified that Warren would provide Cargill
with annual financial statements and that either Cargill would keep
the books for Warren or an independent firm would conduct the
audit. Cargill received the right of access to Warren's books for
inspection. In addition, the agreement provided that Warren was
not to make capital improvements or repairs in excess of a specified
amount without Cargill's prior consent and was not to become
liable as a guarantor or encumber its assets except with Cargill's
154. A. Gayjenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285, 287-88 (Minn. 1981).
155. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14 0 (1958). Section 14 0 provides, "A creditor
who assumes control of his debtor's business for the mutual benefit of himself and his debtor, may
become a principal, with liability for the acts and transactions of the debtor in connection with the
business." Id.
156. Id. comment a.
157. Id. § 14 K.
158. 309 N.W.2d at 294.
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permission, Finally, Warren had to obtain Cargill's consent before
15 9
declaring a dividend or selling and purchasing stock.
For the next several years, Cargill continued to review
Warren's operation and expenses and make recommendations with
respect to the improvement of the Warren operation. 160 Cargill
increased the credit line in 1972 to $750,000 and in 1976 to
$1,250,000. At that time, Warren was shipping Cargill ninety
percent of its cash grain. In addition, approximately twenty-five
percent of Warren's total sales was seed grain that Warren sold as
16
Cargill's agent under separate agreements. '
As Warren's indebtedness continued to exceed its credit line,
Cargill began to contact Warren daily regarding its financial
affairs. Cargill's headquarters informed its regional office in 1973
that, since Warren was using Cargill money, Cargill had the right
to make some of the critical decisions regarding the use of the
funds.1 6 2 When it became evident that Warren had serious
financial problems, Cargill assured several farmers who heard that
Warren's checks were not being paid that "there would be no
problem with payment.' ' 63 In the final days of Warren's
operation, Cargill sent an official to supervise the elevator
operations, including the disbursement of funds and income
1 64
generated by the elevator.
After Warren ceased operations, it owed Cargill $3.6 million.
Wrren also owed the plaintiff-farmers $2 million.1 65 Cargill
contended that an agency relationship did not exist between
Warren and itself because it had not consented to the agency,
Warren did not act on behalf of Cargill, and Cargill did not
exercise control over Warren. The court, however, found that
Cargill assumed de facto control of Warren and was, in fact,
1 66
Warren's principal.
In support of its finding that Cargill had assumed de facto
159. Id. at288.
160 .Id. at 288-89. A Cargill official characterized the Warren operation as an organization that
"needs very strong paternal guidance." Id. at 289 (emphasis supplied by court).
161. Id. at289.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 289,291.
164. Id. at 289. By April of 1977 Warren was $4 million in debt. Id.
165. Id. at 289-90.
166. Id. at 290-91. In finding that Cargill was Warren's principal, the court noted:
By directing Warren to implement its recommendations, Cargill manifested its
consent that Warren would be its agent. Warren acted on Cargill's behalfin procuring
grain for Cargill as the part of its normal operations which were totally financed by
Cargill. Further, an agency relationship was established by Cargill's interference with
the internal affairs of Warren, which constituted de facto control of the elevator.
Id. at 291.
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control of the elevator, the court recited the following: Cargill made
"constant recommendations to Warren by telephone;" Cargill had
a right of first refusal on Warren's grain; Cargill imposed
restrictive covenants upon Warren and restricted its ability to enter
into mortgages, purchase stock, or pay dividends without its
approval; Cargill had a right of entry onto Warren's premises to
carry on periodic checks and audits; Cargill criticized Warren's
finances, officer's salaries, and inventory; Cargill determined that
Warren needed "strong paternal guidance;" Cargill provided
drafts and forms to Warren upon which Cargill's name was
imprinted and which were used in the operation of the Warren
business; Cargill financed all of Warren's grain purchases and
operating expenses; and Cargill had the power to discontinue the
financing of Warren's operation. 167
While the Cargill court found that Cargill was in control of
Warren, and established itself as Warren's principal under the
Restatement standard, it is significant that the court also found that
Cargill "kept Warren in existence" for-its own purposes. 16 8 This
was not the case in Krivo. In Krivo the creditor merely used its
influence to maintain its position and protect its interests rather
than engage in further profit taking, gain an unfair advantage, or
do harm to other creditors. On the contrary, the creditor in Krivo
assisted the debtor with liquidation plans designed to benefit other
creditors.

69

1

V. BANKRUPTCY CHALLENGES TO CREDITOR
CONTROL
Should the debtor file a bankruptcy petition, the risks to a
creditor who is exerting a significant amount of "leverage" over
the debtor significantly increase. As a result of filing the
bankruptcy petition, there may well be a trustee who will be very
interested in the conduct of the lender. If a debtor filed a chapter 11
petition a creditor's committee may likewise be interested in the
lender's conduct. 17 0 The two principal challenges to creditor
167. Id. at 291. Concerning Cargill's contention that Warren was merely a supplier, the court
noted that a party must show that he is an independent business to establish that he is a supplier. Id.
See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY 5 14 K comment a. Again, the court found that tte decisions
made by Warren were not independent of Cargill's interest or its control. 309 N.W.2d at 292. The
court concluded that "the relationship that existed between the parties was not merely that tf'buyer
and supplier." Id.
168. 309 N.W.2d at 293.
169. 483 F.2d at 1108-09.
170. See 11 U.S.C. S 1102(a) (1982). Section 1102(a) authorizes a bankruptcy court to appoint
"a committee of creditors." Id.
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control under the Bankruptcy Code will be under the "insider"
preference rule of section 547(b)(4)(B) and the "equitable
subordination" doctrine of section 510(c).
A. INSIDER PREFERENCES
Under section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, a preference is
a transfer of the debtor's property to or for the benefit of a creditor
for or on account of an antecedent debt. 17 1 The transfer must have
been made while the debtor was insolvent or within ninety days
172
(one year for "insiders") before filing the bankruptcy petition.
The effect of the transfer must be to enable the creditor to receive
more then it would receive in a chapter 7 bankruptcy if the debtor
had not made the transfer.

173

Congress made an important change in the law with regard to
preferences when it enacted section 547(b). The "insider" concept
did not exist in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.174 Under prior law,
payments made to a controlling lender, relative, or other insider
more than four months prior to the filing of the bankruptcy, could
not be attacked by a creditor as a preference, but only as fraudulent
conveyances. 175 The insider preference provisions of section 547(b)
allow the trustee in bankruptcy or a debtor-in-possession to
challenge transactions between a debtor and an insider that the
debtor made up to one year before he filed a petition in
bankruptcy.

176

According to one commentator, section 547 is designed to
promote two goals: to discourage creditors from racing to
dismember the debtor during his "slide into bankruptcy" and to
promote equality among creditors by not allowing a debtor to favor
any one creditor. 177 Of these two, equality among creditors is the
171. Id. S547 (b)(1), (2).
172. Id. S547 (bX4).
173. Id. 547 (b)(5).
174. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544.
175. See 4 W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1547.01 (L. King 15th ed. 1979).
176. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (b)(4) (1982). Section 547 (b)(4) provides that the trustee may avoid
any transfer of property of the debtor made:
(A)on or within 90 days before the date of filing of the petition; or
(B) between 90 days and one year before the date of filing of the petition, if such
creditor, at the time of such transfer(i) was an insider; and
(ii) had reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent at the time of such
transfer ....

Id. Section 101(25) defines "insider." See supra note 48 for the text of S5101(25).
177. Note, The Term Insider Within Section 547 (bX4XB) of the Bankruptcy Code, 57 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 726, 727-28(1982).
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overriding goal. 178 Congress enacted the insider preference
provisions of section 547 to foster the stated goals of the section. 179
Under the Code, an insider is one "who has a sufficiently close
relationship with the debtor that his conduct is made subject to
closer scrutiny than those dealing at arm's length with the
debtor. ' 180 Thus, the true test of whether one is an insider is
whether he has a relationship with the debtor that courts cannot
1
characterize as an arm's length transaction. 81
The insider concept is not capable of precise definition; the
Code's definition is open ended and merely lists examples of insider
relationships. 1 2 Thus, who will qualify as an insider under the
Code is a question of fact that a court must decide upon a review of
all the facts and circumstances in each case. 18 3 For example, in In re
Montanino,18 4 the court, after carefully reviewing all the facts behind
the transfer of property, concluded that the parents of a woman
with whom the debtor was living were insiders within the meaning
of section 547(b)(4)(B). The court found that the relationship
between the woman's mother and the debtor "was more than
sufficiently close to eliminate any finding of an arms-length
transaction.

"'185

178. See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 177-78, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5963, 6138.
179. See Note, supra note 177, at 729-30. The commentator explains the rationale for the insider
preference provision as follows:
The primary reason for such exacting scrutiny of insiders is that persons with a close
relationship to the debtor naturally have access to more information. Thus, insiders
can exert greater influence on the debtor, which causes insider transactions to be less
vulnerable to the market pressures that help control arm's length transactions.
Exacting scrutiny is also warranted because the insider's close relationship to the
debtor may veil a potentially preferential transfer, or may even deliberately conceal
the preference.
Id.
180. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 312, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5963, 6269.
181. See, e.g., In re Taylor, 29 Bankr. 5, 7 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983) (an insider must have a
"close relationship with the debtor"); In re Montanino, 15 Bankr. 307, 310 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1981)
("an 'insider' is one who has such a relationship with the debtor that their dealing with one another
cannot be characterized as an arm's-length transaction").
182. Section 101(25) of the Bankruptcy Code provides a definition of insider. See supra note 48
for the text of S 101(25). Section 101(25) provides that an "insider includes' [list of categories]." II
U.S.C. 5 101(25) (1976) (emphasis added). In addition, 11 U.S.C. § 102(3) provides that
" 'includes' and 'including' are not limiting." Id. S 102(3) (1982). Thus, § 101(25) apparently
provides only a partial list of those who are insiders under the Code.
For two decisions that have narrowly construed "insider" to constitute only those listed in
5 101(25), see In re Yonkers Hamilton Sanitarium, Inc., 22 Bankr. 427, 430 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(government and its agent not insiders); In re Castillo, 7 Bankr. 135, 137 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(defendant bank that was not a relative, partner, director, office or person in control of the debtor
was not an "insider").
183. In re Taylor, 29 Bankr. at 7 (citing 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 101.25 (15th ed. 1979)).
184. 15 Bankr. 307 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1981).
185. In re Montanino, 15 Bankr. 307, 310-11 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1981). In Montanino the debtor
purchased realty with funds borrowed from the defendant. The parties did not execute a promissory
note or provide for interest or repayment terms. Id. at 308. In repayment of the loan, the debtor
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When the debtor is a corporation or partnership, the insider
definition contained in section 101(25) includes a "person in
control of the debtor. ' "186 The Code does not define "person in
control" or "control." According to at least one commentator,
Congress intended the same broad concept of control as exists in
the securities law. 187 If this is Congress' intent, given the dual
policies of section 547, "[t]here is no reason why a bank providing
necessary financing to an insolvent enterprise could not be
considered to be in control and therefore an insider." 188 This would
particularly be true in situations in which the bank could declare
the loan in default at any time and held either the personal
guarantees of the principals or collateral that is vital to the
operation of the business. 189 In addition, given the expansive
concept of insider, no reason exists why the control concept
embodied in section 101(25) should necessarily be limited to
control over legal entities such as partnerships or corporations. If it
is possible for a lender to be in control of a corporate debtor for
purposes of section 547, no reason exists why a lender cannot be in
control of the individual debtor. The twin goals of section 547
prohibiting debtor dismemberment at the hands of creditors and
preventing unequal treatment of creditors, are not necessarily
limited to cases involving pervasive lender control of nonindividual
debtors. Therefore, the prohibited control practices should not
depend upon the character of the debtor.
This is not to say that all agricultural operating lenders are
necessarily insiders. Depending upon the facts and circumstances
of a particular case, an agricultural operating lender may well
possess enough badges of control to render its relationship with the
debtor sufficiently close to subject its transactions with the debtor to
close scrutiny in order to determine whether those dealings are at
arm's length. 190 Nothing in the Code or in the legislative history
appears to prohibit this exacting scrutiny.
transferred the realty to the defendants. Id. at 309. The court noted that the deed to the defendants
recited that "this is a conveyance between relatives." Id. at 310. The court also found it significant
that the debtor cohabitated with the defendant's daughter for a period of five years before the
transfer. Id.
186. 11 U.S.C. S 101(25)(B)(iii) (1982).
187. See Queenan, supra note 38, at 470. The regulations issued under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 provide that control is "possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the
direction of management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting
securities, by contract, or otherwise." 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (1983).
188. Queenan, supra note 38, at 470.
189. Id.
190. See In rejefferson Mortgage Co., 25 Bankr. 963 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1982). InJefferson Mortgage
the court found that the lender was not an insider because "not a scintilla of evidence" existed
indicating that the concessions the lender obtained "rose to the level of a special relationship that
would characterize the Bank as an 'insider' for purposes of S 547." Id. at 970.
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Even if a court finds that a lender is an insider, however, the
trustee or debtor-in-possession must prove two additional elements.
First, they must show that the insider had reasonable cause to
believe that the debtor was insolvent. 19 1 They must also show that
the debtor was actually insolvent on the date of the transfer. 192 The
standard for reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent
is whether the creditor has sufficient actual information respecting
the debtor's financial condition so that an ordinary prudent person
would be put on notice and inquiry as to his financial status. 193 This
standard requires neither actual knowledge nor actual belief of the
debtor's insolvency. 1 94 Whether a creditor had reasonable cause to
believe the debtor was insolvent is a question of fact that courts
must resolve on a case by case basis. 195 Due to this heavy burden of
proof, however, the reasonable cause standard may result in
sheltering transfers that have benefited the insider at the expense of
other creditors.
In addition to proving that the creditor had reasonable cause to
believe that the debtor was insolvent on the date of the transfer, the
trustee or debtor-in-possession must also prove that the debtor was
actually insolvent when he made the transfer for insider preferences
falling outside the ninety day period. 196 The Bankruptcy Act's
197
balance sheet test of insolvency still applies under the Code.
They must show, therefore, that on the transfer date the debtor's
debts were greater than its assets, which are valued at their fair
market value. Proving actual insolvency on a date up to one year
prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition may be difficult. 9 8
Presumably, however, a debtor-in-possession would have an easier
time proving this than a trustee since the debtor will be relying
upon his own records.
Should a court find that an agricultural operating lender is an
insider, application of section 547(c)(5) could be disastrous for the
191. 11 U.S.C. 5 547 (b)(4)(B)(ii) (1982).
192. Id. § 547 (bX3). Trhe presumption of insolvency is not applicable beyond the 90-day "noninsider" preference period of § 547(b)(4). Id. § 547(f) (1982).
193. Montanino, 15 Bankr. at 311.
194. Id.
195. In reGruber Bottling Works, Inc., 16 Bankr. 348,352 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982). On the facts
in Gruber Bottling the court found that the creditor "had no reasonable cause to believe that the debtor
was insolvent.'" Id. at 354.
196. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY supra note 175,
547.26.
197. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(26) (A) (1982). Section 101(26)(A) provides that one is insolvent
"when the sum of his debts is greater than all of [his] property." Id. Thus, insolvency reflects one's
balance sheet.
198. See Queenan, supra note 38, at 470. The commentator notes, however, that courts may be
"fairly liberal in permitting the trustee to link up the debtor's condition on the filing date with any
time during the prior year though evidence indicating that what transpired during the year consisted
only of an insolvent enterprise going further downhill." Id.
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lender.t 99 Section 547(c)(5) considers transfers that improve a
creditor's position or result in a reduction in the secured party's
security interest during the preference period. 20 0 If the creditor is
not undersecured during this period, he will escape difficulty. The
focus of the section is on the improvement of the secured party's

position caused by the enhancement of the collateral's value during
the preference period. If the lender's position is improved, it has
realized a preference.
Section 547(c)(5) applies only to inventory and receivables;
inventory for the purpose of section 547 includes "farm products
such as crops or livestock, held for sale or lease. "201 In addition,
section 547(e)(3) provides that a preferential transfer does not exist
"until
the debtor has acquired rights in the property
transferred. "202 These provisions appear to be very significant for
the agricultural operating lender.
It would appear that under section 547(c)(5) two situations
exist by which an agricultural creditor may be at risk. If a lender
makes a loan before the farmer-borrower plants the crops and if the
planting occurs within the preference period, the crop lender whose
lien on the crops is dependent upon an after-acquired property
clause may have obtained a preferential transfer. Since a debtor has
no rights in growing crops until he plants them, the section 547
transfer occurs at the time of planting and the earlier loan is an
antecedent debt. 20 3 If he plants the crops prior to the preference
period, the planting itself would not seem to be a preferential
transfer. To the extent that the crop increases in value during the
preferential period, however, a corresponding preference challenge
5

7

199. 11 U.S.C. 5 4 (c)(5) (1982). Section 547(c)(5) provides that § 547(b) does not apply to a
transfer of the following:
[A] perfected security interest in inventory or a receivable or the proceeds of either,
except to the extent that the aggregate of all such transfers to the transferee caused a
reduction, as of the date of the filing of the petition and to the prejudice of other
creditors holding unsecured claims, of any amount by which the debt secured by such
security interest exceeded the value of all security interests for such debt on the later
of(A)(i) with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(A) of this section applies,
90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(ii) with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(B) of this section applies,
one year before the date of the filing of the petition; and
(B)
the (late on which new value was first given under the security agreement
creating such security interest. ...
Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. 5 547(a)(1).
202. Id. § 547(e)(3).
203. Reiley, Farming Failures and Drafting Failures: The Uncertain Posture of Crop Financing Under
Article 9 and § 547 of the Bankruptcy Code, ANN. SuRv. BANKR. L. 29, 39 (1983).
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may result. 20 4 While the creditor will argue that no "transfer"
exists that would result in the enhancement of value of the collateral
subject to section 547, the broad definition of "transfer" contained
in the Code 20 5 may well provide a trustee or debtor-in-possession
with a claim for conversion of property by the debtor for the
20 6
enhanced value of the collateral subject to a security interest.
Courts, however, have been reluctant to apply section 547 to
the enhancement of value of collateral during the preference
period; therefore, the agricultural operating lender who may
potentially be classified as an insider by the court must be very
conscious of the risks of the extended preference period applicable
to insiders. For example, in In re Nivens 207 the court, in dicta,
indicated that section 547 was not applicable to a mere increase in
crop value during the preference period. 20 8 And in Fairchild v.
Lebanon Production Credit Association20 9 the court indicated that the
mere increase in the value of existing collateral, without a transfer,
was not a preferential transfer under the Code.2

10

Thus, a lender

should be aware of the potential challenge to his security interest in
crops that the debtor plants or livestock he acquires during the
preference period.
204. Id. at 40. Professor Reiley contends that the value enhancement in growing crops should
not be viewed as a transfer because no assets of the debtor are diverted to the crops. Id.
205. See 11 U.S.C. S 101(41) (1982). Section 101(42) provides: " 'Transfer' means every mode,
direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with
property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest." Id.
206. See Reiley, supra note 203, at 41. Professor Reiley states:
Cultivation, fertilization and irrigation within the preference period require the
expenditure of dollars or incurring debt for materials and labor and the use of the
debtor's equipment and the debtor's labor. The cost of these activities would seem to
be a transfer. To the extent that cost is paid from assets otherwise available to
unsecured creditors there is a transfer to the prejudice of creditors within the meaning
of Section 547(c)(5).
Id. Therefore, he appears to suggest that additional costs incurred by a debtor in the furtherance of
his farming operation within the preference period constitutes a voidable preference under the Code.
207. 22 Bankr. 287 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982). In Nivens creditors of the bankrupt debtor claimed
that they had liens to disaster payments and government support payments by virtue of their security
interests in crops and the proceeds of crops. In re Nivens, 22 Bankr. 287, 289 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1982).
208. Id. at 293. The court noted that when the volume of inventory increases during the
preference period, the lien that affixes against the increase becomes voidable. When onlv the value of
inventory increases, however, the increase in value does not constitute an avoidable preference. Id.
209.31 Bankr. 789 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983). In Fairchildthe defendant had a security interest in
the debtor's "feeder" hogs. The debtor subsequently converted his business to a hog "breeder"
operation. Fairchild v. Lebanon Prod. Credit Ass'n, 31 Bankr. 789, 791 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983).
The court held that the subsequently acquired "breeder" hogs were covered by the defendant's
security interest. Id. at 793.
210. Id, at 794. The debtors contended that the defendant's interest in the hogs that were born
within 90 days of the filing of the petition did not attach until the hogs were born. Id. at 793. The
court concluded that the defendant's rights attached to the entire herd and that the increase in the
herd was merely an increase in value. Id. at 794. The court indicated thai had new hogs been acquired,
liev would have been subject to a preference. Id.
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EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION

As previously discussed, equality of distribution among
creditors is a fundamental theme of the Bankruptcy Code. 211 The
fundamental purpose behind section 547 is to allow a trustee or
debtor-in-possession to recapture a debtor's preferential transfers
that benefit one creditor at the expense of others. 21 2 In addition to
authorizing the avoidance of preferential transfers, the Bankruptcy
Code allows a bankruptcy court, sitting as a court of equity,
"under principles of equitable subordination," to subordinate all
or part of a claim to all or part of any other allowed claim. 21 3 Courts
have long viewed this power as merely an exercise of broad
equitable powers of the bankruptcy court to correct abuses, fraud,
and inequity that would otherwise result from a strict application of
21 4
the equal distribution principle of the bankruptcy laws.

The Bankruptcy Code, rather than providing guidance to the
courts in administering the doctrine of subordination, merely
provides that courts should invoke the doctrine "under principles
of equitable subordination. ' 21 5 The Code's legislative history
indicates that courts should apply equitable subordination
according to existing case law, leaving the development of the
concept to the courts. 216 Because of this dependence upon prior case
law, it is necessary to briefly review the development of equitable
subordination.
211. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY supra note 175, 547.03111.
212. See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 177-78, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
At). NFvws 5963, 6138. The House Report states that the purpose of § 547 is "to deter 'the race of
diligence' of creditors to dismember the debtor before bankruptcy furthers the second goal of the
preference section - that of equality of distribution." Id. at 178, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 6138.
213. 11 U.S.C. S 510(c)(1) (1982). Section 510(c) provides:
(1) under principles of equitable subordination, subordinate for purposes of
distribution all or part of an allowed claim to all or part of an allowed interest to all or
part of another allowed interest; or
(2) order that any lien securing such a subordinated claim be transferred to the estate.
214. See In re Multiponics, Inc., 622 F.2d 709, 721 (5th Cir. 1980) (bankruptcy court is
authorized to prevent fraudulent, abusive, or unfair course of conduct through equitable
subordination). See also In reKansas City Journal-Post Co., 144 F.2d 791, 800 (8th Cir. 1944). In
Kansas Civ.fournal-Posithe court described equitable subordination as:
a means of regulating distribution results in bankruptcy by adjusting the order of
creditors' payments to the equitable levels of their comparative claim positions.
...[Ilts fundamental aim is to undo or to offset any inequity in the claim position of a
creditor that will produce injustice or unfairness to other creditors in terms of the
bankruptcy results.
Id. at 800.
215. 11 U.S.C. 510(c)(1) (1982).
216. See H.R. Rep. No. 598, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 359, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, 6307, 6315. The House Report states that the court's power to subordinate claims is
"broader than the general doctrine of equitable subordination, and encompasses subordination on
any equitable grounds." Id.
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One of the earliest Supreme Court cases addressing the power
of equitable subordination is Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co. 217
In Taylor, the Court held that since Standard Gas & Electric Co.,
the controlling stockholder of the debtor, contributed to the
debtor's financial distress through mismanagement, the Court
must subordinate Standard's claims for loans made to the debtor to
those of the preferred stockholders. 2 18 Shortly after Taylor, the
Supreme Court decided Pepper v. Litton,2 19 in which a corporation's
dominant and controlling shareholder caused the company to
confess a judgment for salary claims prior to the corporation's
bankruptcy. After the corporation commenced bankruptcy
220
proceedings the shareholder attempted to enforce the judgment.
The Court held that the shareholder abused his fiduciary position
and violated the "rules of fair play and good conscience. ' 221 The
Fifth Circuit has clarified this vague standard of fair play and good
conscience more recently in In re Mobile Steel Co. 222
In Mobile Steel the claimants were the organizers, officers, and
directors of a corporation controlled by one"of the claimants. 223 The
claimants presented two classes of claims during the bankruptcy
proceedings. They based the first upon debentures issued to the
claimants by the company's predecessor. 224 They based the second
claim upon promissory notes issued to three of the claimants in
exchange for commercial property. 22 5 The bankruptcy court
determined that the consideration which the claimants gave for the
217. 306 U.S. 307 (1939).
218. Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307, 323 (1939). In Taylor the Court found
that Standard completely controlled the debtor, Deep Rock, since Standard owned nearly all of Deep
Rock's common stock, a majority of Deep Rock's directors were Standard officers, directors, or
agents, and Standard controlled the fiscal affairs of Deep Rock as its only creditor. Id.
219. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
220. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 298 (1939). In Pepper v.Litton the petitioner brought suit
against a corporation and its controlling shareholder for unpaid royalties. Id. at 297. While the suit
was pending, the controlling shareholder of the corporation caused the corporation to confess a
judgment for past salary claims. Id. The shareholder acquired the corporation's property through an
execution sale and transferred it to a new wholly owned corporation. Id. at 298. The corporation then
filed a voluntary petition inbankruptcy. Id.
221. Id. at 310. The Court found that the actions of the controlling shareholder revealed a
scheme to defraud the petitioner. Id. at 296.
222. 563 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1977).
223. In re Mobile Steel Co., 563 F.2d 692, 695 (5th Cir. 1977). In Mobile Steel a group of
investors formed E.B.F. Co., Inc., and purchased the assets of a corporation. Id. at 696. The
purchase was financed by a secured bank loan, the proceeds of the capital contributions of the
investors, and the proceeds of the issuance of debentures to the investors. Id. The corporation then
changed its name to Mobile Steel Co., Inc. (Mobile Steel). Id. at 697.
224. Id. at 695.
225. Id. Mobile 1Steel purchased realty from a partnership. Id. at 697-98. Two of the three
partners of the partnership were directors and shareholders of Mobile Steel. Id. at 697. Mobile Steel
financed the transaction by assuming the mortgage debt on the property and issuing promissory
notes to the partnership for the balance of the purchase price. Id. at 698. Mobile Steel then sold the
property. Id. As part of the sales agreement, the partnership released its security interest in the
property and surrendered the promissory notes. Id. Mobile Steel then issued new promissory notes to
the partners individually. Id.
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debentures constituted a contribution to capital rather than a loan.
Thus, the bankruptcy court disallowed their first claim. 226 The
second group of claims was subordinated to the claims of the other
secured creditors on the ground that the claimants failed to
establish affirmatively the proper performance of their fiduciary
obligations, which supported their claims. 227 The district court
affirmed this decision. On appeal, the court of appeals held that
both the disallowance and the subordination of the claims were
improper. 228 According to the court, the following three conditions
must be satisfied before a bankruptcy court may exercise the power
of equitable subordination: "[1] The claimant must have engaged
in some type of inequitable conduct.... [2] The misconduct must
have resulted in injury to the creditors of the bankrupt or conferred
an unfair advantage on the claimant. . . . [3] Equitable
subordination of the claim must not be inconsistent with the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. "229 In addition to these three
conditions to the exercise of the power of equitable subordination,
the court indicated that three "principles' must be considered.
First, the inequitable conduct need not relate to the acquisition or
assertion of the claim.2 30 Second, a court should subordinate a
claim only to the extent necessary to offset the harm that the debtor
and its creditors suffered because of the inequitable conduct. 2 3'
Third, it is up to the objecting trustee to come forward with enough
substantiation to overcome the claimant's prima facie case that
exists as a result of the filing and proving of a claim. Once he has
232
filed his claim, the claimant must prove its validity and honesty.
While the equitable subordination of a creditor's claim may
often be the most appropriate and effective means to prevent a
226. Id. at 702. The bankruptcy judge determined that the debentures were really preferred
stock and not entitled to treatment as debt. 'Id.
227. Id. at 704. The bankruptcy judge concluded that because of the poor financial position of
Mobile Steel, purchase of the property constituted culpable mismanagement by the directors. Id.
The bankruptcy judge also noted that the directors personally benefited from the purchase from their
partnership. Id.
228. 563 F.2d at 706.
229. Id. at 700 (citations omitted).
230. Id. See In re Kansas City Journal-Post Co., 144 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1944). The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Kansas City Journal-Post noted that inequitable conduct warranting
subordination "need not . . . be specifically related to the creditor's claim, either in its origin or
acquisition .....Id. at 804.
231. 563 F.2d at 701. The court noted that, since the subordination power is remedial rather
than penal, subordination of a creditor's claim in an amount greater than the injury he has caused to
the bankrupt would be improper. Id.
232. Id. The court stated that a trustee's objection must contain a "substantial factual basis to
support its allegation of impropriety." Id. To not require a substantial factual basis would place an
unwarranted burden on the fiduciary to prove the fairness of all of their transactions with the
bankrupt. Id. The court noted, however, that once the initial presumption of validity is overcome,
fiduciaries' claims demand a "large measure of watchful care." Id. at 702. (citing Washburn v.
Green, 133 U.S. 30, 43 (1890)).
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creditor from realizing the benefits of an inequitable course of
conduct, courts should recognize that equitable subordination
provides a basis for correcting inequities caused as a result of a
creditor's own actions.23 3 Thus, the court's equitable powers
should not enhance one creditor's rights to the detriment of
another's legitimate rights.
Generally, inequitable conduct refers to conduct that would
make it unfair to allow a creditor his claim or, if his claim is
allowed, to permit him to pursue his claim on a parity with other
similarly situated creditors. Oftentimes, therefore, courts order
subordination upon findings of fraud, illegality, undercapitalization of the debtor, or a claimant's use of the debtor as a
mere "instrumentality.' 23 4 The fraud and instrumentality grounds
are most applicable to the case of an agricultural operating lender
who may be exposed to an equitable subordination charge.
In the context of equitable subordination, "fraud" is much
broader than the traditional common law concept. 235 For example,
fraud may involve the misuse of a judgment claim to the detriment
of other creditors. 236 Fraud may also involve the misrepresentation
of a debtor's financial status. 237 Finally, fraud may consist of the
breach of a fiduciary relationship, typically the duty owed by a
shareholder to a corporation.2 38 Courts, however, have never
limited the subordination doctrine to fiduciaries alone. 239 If the
233. See In re Kansas CityJournal-Post Co., 144 F.2d at 800-01. The court in Kansas CityJournalPost stated that:
the power of subordination ... should not operate to take away anything punitively to
which one creditor is justly entitled in view of the liquidation finality, and bestow it
upon others, who in the relative situation have no fair right to it. It can therefore
ordinarily go no farther than to level off actual inequitable disparities on the
bankruptcy terrain for which a creditor is responsible, to the point where they will not
create unjust disadvantages in claim positions and liquidation results.
Id.
234. Note, Deep Rock in the Deep South - Equitable Subordinationof Claims in FifthCircuitBankruptcy
Proceedings, 11 Cum. L. REV. 619, 626 (1981); Herzog & Zweibel, The EquitableSubordination Claims in
Bankruptcy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 83, 83 (1961).
235. Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 234, at 98-99. The commentators note that fraudulent
conduct requiring equitable subordination need not "fit into the classic common law concept of
fraud.' Id. at 99. Section 548 of the Code allows a trustee to totally avoid a fraudulent transfer of an
interest of the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. 5 548(a)(1) (1982).
236. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 312 (1939) (confession of judgment in favor of
controlling shareholder to defraud creditors); In re Lockwood, 14 Bankr. 374, 381 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y.
1981) (judgment obtained against debtor through fraud).
237. See, e.g., L & M Realty Corp. v. Leo, 249 F.2d 668, 672 (4th Cir. 1957) (when stockholder
fraudulently obtained loan, his claim subordinated to repayment of loan in bankruptcy of
corporation); In re Bowman Hardware & Elec. Co., 67 F.2d 792, 795 (7th Cir. 1934) (when
claimant's loan to bankrupt not disclosed to creditors at claimant's request, claimant's loan
subordinated to creditors' claims).
238. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 312 (1939) (controlling shareholder caused bankrupt
corporation to confess judgment in his favor to defraud creditor).
239. See In reTeltronics Servs., Inc., 29 Bankr. 139, 169 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1983). In Teltronics
the court noted that while "the overwhelming majority of subordination cases involve the claims of
fiduciaries ... the subordination doctrine has never been strictly limited to fiduciaries." Id.
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claimant is a fiduciary, the court will subject his dealings with the
debtor to more exacting scrutiny. 24 0 If the claimant is a nonfiduciary, "egregious conduct must be proven with particularity.
[I]t is insufficient for the objectant in such cases merely to
establish sharp dealings; rather he must prove that the claimant is
guilty of gross misconduct tantamount to 'fraud, overreaching or
spoliation to the detriment of others.' ",241 For purposes of
equitable subordination, a court may well find a creditor exercising
control over a debtor to be a fiduciary.2 4 2 That one is a fiduciary is
not of itself sufficient to result in subordination of the fiduciary's
24 3
claim; inequitable conduct must have occurred.
The second type of inequitable conduct that may give rise to
the equitable subordination of a creditor's claim is the self-serving
domination of a debtor by a creditor to the detriment of other
creditors or the debtor himself. This conduct generally arises in the
context of a relationship between a corporation and a claimant in
which the self interest of the claimant is the motivating force behind
the debtor corporation's transactions. These transactions are
indicative of the "instrumentality"

or alter-ego cases. 2 4

As

discussed previously under the instrumentality theory, the mere
domination of a debtor by another is not sufficient to establish
inequitable conduct. Rather, it is the use of that domination to the
advantage of the dominating corporation resulting in injury to the
24 5
subsidiary that brings subordination into play. The presence of inequitable conduct, without more, does not
246
warrant the subordination of a claim under the Mobile Steel test.
The misconduct must result in injury to the creditors of the debtor
240. Id. (citing Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-08 (1939)).
241. In re Teltronics Servs., Inc., 29 Bankr. at 169 (quoting In re W.T. Grant Co., 4 Bankr. 53,
75 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 699 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1983)).
242. 29 Bankr. at 170 (creditor may be held to tiduciary standard if he exerts control amounting
to domination of will).
243. See, e.g., In re Featherworks Corp., 25 Bankr. 634, 648 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1982) (creditor
must show that claimant's conduct was inequitable and resulted in injury to creditor or unfair
advantage to claimant); In re De Feo Fruit Co., 24 Bankr. 220, 226 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982) (some
misconduct related to claim necessary to subordinate claim).
244. See Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939). In Taylor a parent
mismanaged and dominated its bankrupt subsidiary, Deep Rock Oil Corp. (Deep Rock). Id. at 320.
The Court recognized the instrumentality rule, which would treat Deep Rock as an agent of the
parent and preclude the parent's claim. Id. at 322. The Court held that because the parent had
mismanaged and dominated Deep Rock, its claim was subordinate to the claims of preferred
shareholders. Id. at 324. From Taylor equitable subordination has come to be known as "the Deep
Rock doctrine." See Note, supra note 234, at 621 for a discussion of the Deep Rock doctrine.
245. Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1103 (5th
Cir. 1973). The court in Krivo noted that liability under the instrumentality rule requires that the
dominant corporation must have proximately caused harm to the plaintiff. Id. See supra notes 132-52
for a discussion of Krivo.
246. See In re Mobile Steel Co., 563 F.2d 692, 699-702. In Mobile Steel the court stated that
inequitable conduct was only one of three conditions that must exist before a court may properly
exercise equitable subordination. Id. at 699-700. See supra text accompanying note 229 for the Mobile
Steel test.
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or confer an unfair advantage on the claimant. 24 7 It is not necessary
under this test, however, for the claimant to both obtain an
advantage and cause injury to other creditors. 2, 8 The third
requirement in the Mobile Steel test is that the subordination must be
consistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 249 Thus, a
bankruptcy court cannot grant equitable relief that overrides
congressional directives concerning the manner in which courts
should marshal or protect priorities. 250 The bankruptcy court's
power to subordinate is, therefore, not unlimited.
Because the equitable subordination power is remedial and not
punitive, the intended beneficiaries of a subordination are the other
creditors, not the debtor. 25 1 The proper party to seek equitable
subordination, therefore, is generally the trustee in bankruptcy or
the creditors. 252 Although a debtor-in-possession in a chapter 11
reorganization has all the powers of a trustee, 253 at least one court
25 4
has held that the debtor has no standing to raise the doctrine.
In addressing the issue of whether a creditor's claim should be
equitably subordinated, one must again begin with the proposition
that a creditor is not a fiduciary of his debtor. However, as
discussed above, when a creditor exercises pervasive control, a
court may hold the creditor accountable under a fiduciary
standard. Several cases are helpful in analyzing this issue.
In In re American Lumber Co. ,255 the Federal District Court for
the District of Minnesota found "overwhelming" evidence that a
lender purposefully manipulated a debtor's operations in a manner
detrimental to the debtor's unsecured creditors.

256

Among the

indicia of control the court found sufficient to establish a complete
domination of will were the following:
247. Id. at 700.
248. Id. at 700-02. See also In re Multiponics, Inc., 622 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1980). In Muliponics
the court noted that equitable subordination was appropriate when "the misconduct resulted in
injury 'to the creditorsof the bankrupt,' not necessarily directly to the bankrupt." Id. at 721 (emphasis
supplied by court).
249. 563 F.2d at 700.
250. In re Dade County Dairies, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 438 (S.D. Fla. 1979). In Dade County Dairies
the court noted that equitable subordination of a claim cannot be inconsistent with the Bankruptcy
Act and, therefore, held that the bankruptcy court was without equitable powers to subordinate an
administrative expense claim to which the Act gave priority. Id. at 440.
251. In re Multiponics, Inc., 622 F.2d at 721. The court in Multiponicsnoted that injury resulting
from misconduct must be shown to have resulted " 'to the creditors of the bankrupt,' not necessarily
directly to the bankrupt itself." Id. (emphasis by the court).
252. In re Weeks, 28 Bankr. 958, 960 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983) (proper party to seek equitable
subordination is creditor or trustee); In re Lockwood, 14 Bankr. 374, 381 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1981)
(proper party to seek equitable subordination is trustee).
253. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(1982).
254. See In re Weeks, 28 Bankr. at 960. The court stated that "debtors have no standing to raise
the doctrine [of equitable subordination]." Id.
255.5 Bankr. 470 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980).
256. In re American Lumber Co., 5 Bankr. 470, 478 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980). See supra notes
56-59 and accompanying text for the facts of American Lumber.
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(1) The bank had the right to a controlling interest in the
debtor's stock pledged as collateral in the event of a default in the
loan obligation;
(2)The bank, which was the debtor's sole source of credit,
placed the debtor within its coercive powers by refusing to honor
the debtor's payroll checks, and by foreclosing on its security
interests in the debtor's only source of ready cash; and
(3) The bank forced compliance with its wishes by imposing
such harsh measures on the debtor as forcing the termination of
most employees, requiring drastic reductions in officers' salaries,
coercing execution of security agreements on the debtor's only
remaining assets, and determining which creditors were to be paid
2 51
by the debtor.
Another case in which the court held a non-insider creditor to
a fiduciary standard is In re Process-Manz Press, Inc.25 8 In ProcessManz the claimant held a possessory pledge of substantially all the
bankrupt debtor's common stock, endorsed in blank. The debtor
assigned all of its receivables to the claimant, and the claimant
collected the proceeds and supplied funds for the bankrupt's
payroll and other expenses. 259 In addition, the creditor participated
in a stock redemption that adversely affected other creditors. 260 The
court found that the control that the creditor exercised over the
bankrupt was so pervasive that the claimant was "in substance the
owner" of the debtor, and therefore a fiduciary. 26 1 Since the court
found that the creditor engaged in unfair and fraudulent conduct to
the detriment of the debtor, its claims were equitably
subordinated.262
In In re Prima, 263 the court determined that a bankrupt debtor's
acquiescence in a bank's recommendation to hire a particular
general manager was insufficient to constitute a domination of its
will.2 64 The bank provided all the debtor's financial support
through one year of continuing losses and the debtor and its three
257.5 Bankr. at 473-74.
258. 236 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Ill. 1964), rev'don other grounds, 369 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967).
259. In re Process-Manz Press, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 333, 336-37 (N.D. Il1. 1964), rev'd on other
grounds, 369 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967). See supra notes 78-81 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the facts of Process-Manz.
260. Id. at 338-39. The court found that Armstrong caused the bankrupt to redeem its preferred
stock at a time when the bankrupt was unable to pay its debts as they matured. Id. at 348.
261. Id. at 348. The bankruptcy referee found that Armstrong, holding over 90% of the stock of
the bankrupt and controlling all its income, was not an ordinary secured creditor but the "alter ego"
of the bankrupt. Id.
262. Id. at 348-50. The court found that Armstrong's actions towards the bankrupt's creditors
were "unfair, inequitable and unconscionable." Id. at 348.
263. 98 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. 1938).
264. In re Prima Co., 98 F.2d 952, 964 (7th Cir. 1938).
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principals, who had guaranteed the debts with the bank, believed
that if the debtor did not enter into the contract with the bank's
general manager, the bank would call the loan. 265 The court held
that because the bank was a nonfiduciary, its threat to call the
outstanding loans did not constitute overreaching but rather was
the lawful exercise of its legal rights. 266 In arriving at its holding the
court noted that the debtor voluntarily entered into a second
contract with the manager without the knowledge or consent of the
bank involved. 267 In addition, the debtor never communicated with
the bank regarding any of the acts of alleged mismanagement later
raised. 268
Finally, in In re W. T. Grant Co.,269 the court considered
whether creditor-banks influenced several of the debtor's key
financial decisions in the period of time immediately preceding the
commencement of bankruptcy proceedings.2 70 Several of Grant's
creditors sought to have the claims of the banks subordinated. 2 1
The bankruptcy court recognized that courts have denied the
application of equitable subordination in several cases, even when a
creditor exercised a significant degree of daily monitoring of its
debtor. 27 2 As a result, the bankruptcy court rejected the argument
on the theory that the actions taken by the debtor "reflected
independent policy decisions and not rigid submission to the
dictates of the bank claimants." 2 73 On appeal, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit found nothing improper about the bank's
"careful watch" of the debtor's activities, and suggested that the
265. Id. at 964. In Prima the debtor was a beer manufacturer. Id. at 959. The debtor incurred
losses for almost a year before borrowing money from the Harris Trust and Savings Bank (Harris).
Harris, believing that the debtor's troubles were largely due to mismanagement, recommended that
the debtor discharge their old manager and hire Garnett Skinner. Id- at 961.
266. Id. at 965. The debtor believed that if it did not acquiesce in Harris's suggested change of
management, Harris would enforce collection of its loan. Id. at 964. The court noted that the bank
had not threatened to call its loan and the evidence did not establish a domination of the debtor's
will. Id. at 964-65.
267. Id. at 966. Since the debtor entered into a later employment contract with Skinner without
the knowledge or consent of the bank, the court did not consider Skinner to be an agent of the bank.
Id.
268. Id. The court noted that if the debtor had considered Skinner an agent of the bank, it would
have notified the bank of any mismanagement by Skinner. Id.
269. 4 Bankr. 53 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 699 F.2d 599 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 89
(1983).
270. In re W. T. Grant Co., 4 Bankr. 53, 60 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 699 F.2d 599, 60203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 89 (1983). Grant involved the approval of a chapter I1 offer of
compromise and settlement of claims against a bankrupt by holders of the bankrupt's debentures. 4
Bankr. at 56. The debenture holders contended that the bank claimants should be equitably
subordinated to their claims. 4 Bankr. at 60.
271.4 Bankr. at 61.
272. Id. at 75. The court noted that, to establish an equitable subordination claim, a claimant
must show "fraud, overreaching or spoliation to the detriment of others." Id.
273. Id. at 77. The court concluded that the transactions between the banks and the bankrupt
were "the result of arm's-length negotiations conducted in good faith and governed by the dictates of
.iiInd b1usiness judgment." Id. at 76.

486

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 60:445

banks would have been derelict in their duty to their own creditors
274
and equity holders had they not done so.
In reviewing these cases, it seems apparent that the creditors
in American Lumber and Process-Manz exercised rights beyond those
necessary to protect their position. They engaged in affirmative
conduct in which they were active participants in schemes designed
to adversely affect other creditors. In American Lumber the bank
obtained, through coercion, an eleventh-hour security interest in
previously unencumbered collateral. 275 In addition, it paid only
those creditors' claims that would benefit itself.27 6 In Process-Manz
the claimant participated in a stock redemption that resulted in the
debtor being left with an unreasonably small amount of capital for
the continuation of its business. 271 The deprivation of working
capital that resulted, in the eyes of the court, "could have no other
result than to create a belief that the debtor would incur debts
beyond its ability to pay as they matured. ' 278 In addition, both
claimants exercised complete control over the debtor's income. In
both cases, the claimant, by virtue of stock.pledges, controlled the
voting stock of the debtor. In summary, this offensive use of the
creditor's control over the debtor resulted in liability and
subordination of the creditor's claim.
In contrast,, the creditors in Prima and W. T. Grant merely used
their position and influence to maintain the status quo. They took
no actions that resulted in harm to creditors or smacked of fraud,
overreaching, or other inequitable conduct. They merely expected
payment according to the terms of their loan agreements. This
defensive use of influence resulted in findings that no subordination
of their claims existed. In the context of the Mobile Steel standard, in
neither case was the objecting party able to sufficiently prove the
second element, namely, that the inequitable conduct of the
claimant resulted in "injury to the creditors of the bankrupt" or
the conferring of "an unfair advantage on the claimant.' '279
274. 699 F.2d at 610-11. On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that
equitable subordination requires that the claimant show "at least that the banks acted solely for their
own benefit . .. and adversely to the interest of others." 699 F.2d at 610-11. See supra notes 95-97 for
a discussion of the court of appeals' decision in Grant.
275. In re American Lumber Co., 5 Bankr. 470, 474 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980).
276. Id. The court determined that "[t]he injury which occurred to [American Lumber's]
general unsecured creditors is obvious." Id. at 478. The court noted that the bank "sought to
perpetuate a fraud upon the general unsecured creditors." Id. at 479.
277. In re Process-Manz Press, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 333, 339-40. Prior to its dealings with the
creditor, Process-Manz had no mortgages on its property except for balances due on sales contracts
for specific items of property. Id. at 339. After dealing with the creditor, Process-Manz's financial
condition grew progressively worse. Id.
278. Id. at 346. In addition, the court noted that the creditor's conduct could only result in
hindering and delaying the other creditors' claims. Id. at 347.
279. In re Mobile Steel Co., 563 F.2d 692, 700 (5th Cir. 1977).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The creditor who advances funds pursuant to an agricultural
operating loan is in a unique position. The collateral securing the
loan may be worth little at the time the creditor makes the loan, the
debtor may use or consume some of the collateral in the normal
operations of the business, or no possibility of repayment may exist
for several months. Because of these concerns, the agricultural
operating lender will engage in more loan monitoring activities
than his urban counterpart. When the lender determines that a
particular loan is a potential problem loan, the monitoring
activities may well increase.
An agricultural loan agreement in and of itself may be
sufficient to characterize the lender as an insider within the
meaning of section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code, for such an
agreement on its face indicates that the lender has the ability to
control the debtor. In addition, if the lender has used the powers
granted to it by the loan agreement to obtain an unfair advantage
for itself, to do harm to other creditors, or to adversely affect the
debtor, it may also be exposing itself to liability under section
510(c) of the Code. If the lender uses the loan agreement for the
defensive purpose of purely maintaining its position, however, no
liability should attach under section 5 10(c).
If the debtor has avoided bankruptcy, abuse of a loan
agreement may also be the basis for liability in an action brought by
creditors who have been damaged by the abuse. In the action the
creditors will not have the benefit of the policies of the Bankruptcy
Code or the automatic consequences that follow upon the
establishment of an insider preference action. Thus, it may well be
much more difficult for creditors to obtain relief outside of a
bankruptcy court. In either context, however, the court should
consider the factors discussed above in analyzing whether a lender
is in control of the debtor or is in a position vis-a-vis the debtor to
warrant further inquiry.

